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I. INTRODUCTION
After the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Ballard,'
Spiritualism's adherents, like other members of minority belief
systems, could qualify for the same First Amendment protections as
members of mainstream religions. 2  While Spiritualists could thus
celebrate a certain level of victory,3 they still faced intolerance, if not
outright persecution, from some government officials and state
legislatures who continued to believe that common Spiritualist
practices, which include communication with the dead,4 divination,'
I. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
2. Id. at 86-87.
Heresy trials are foreign to our Constitution. Men may believe what they
cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious
doctrines or beliefs. Religious experiences which are as real as life to
some may be incomprehensible to others. Yet the fact that they may be
beyond the ken of mortals does not mean that they can be made suspect
before the law.
Id.
3. Spiritualism as a belief system began on March 30 or 31, 1848 when
young Margaret and Katherine Fox of Hydesville, New York, tricked their
mother into believing that they could communicate with the spirits. By the
time they thought better of the idea, news of their "spiritual gifts" had spread,
and they were unable, or unwilling, to confess the truth, although Maggie
admitted to the hoax in 1888. They spent the next thirty years giving
demonstrations of their abilities. See RUTH BRANDON, THE SPIRITUALISTS: THE
PASSION FOR THE OCCULT IN THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES 1-41
(1983); NANCY RUBIN STUART, THE RELUCTANT SPIRITUALIST: THE LIFE OF
MAGGIE Fox 438-39 (1st ed. 2005).
4. See e.g., Frank Bell Lewis, The Bible and Modern Religions, in
INTERPRETATION, Oct. 1957, at 438, 439.
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and in some cases, faith healing, were simply shams for frauds
perpetrated on members of the public who were grieving over the loss
of loved ones.6  In their grief, members of the public sought out
Spiritualist practitioners who convinced them that their deceased
relatives and friends could speak to them through Spiritualist
intervention, and often with the assistance of donations to- a
Spiritualist church.7 In many cases, Spiritualist ministers did (and
still do) offer assistance in the form of messages from loved ones to
assist in guidance for the future.8
Necromancy ... is immemorial in the human race. Every society of
record ... seems to have favored the belief in one form or another ....
Our curiosity is piqued by the mysterious, and whatever is occult
possesses a dark charm .... More mundane needs, too, encourage this
belief among us: men seek the spirits of the dead to help them foresee
earthly events and to satisfy their natural curiosity or turn such
knowledge to their own advantage; they seek the spirits' aid for the
solution of their problems and the healing of their infirmities.
Id.
5. Divination is the art or practice of obtaining knowledge about the future or the
unknown through supernatural or paranormal means and has a long history. See, e.g.,
DANIEL OGDEN, GREEK AND ROMAN NECROMANCY (2004); J. R. VEENSTRA, MAGIC
AND DIVINATION AT THE COURTS OF BURGUNDY AND FRANCE (1998). "The action or
practice of divining; the foretelling of future events or discovery of what is hidden or
obscure by supernatural or magical means; soothsaying, augury, prophecy." IV THE
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 892 (2d ed. 1989). It is often associated with
necromancy, which the OED defines as "The art of predicting the future by supposed
communication with the dead; (more generally) divination, sorcery, witchcraft,
enchantment." Id. at 284.
6. These practices strongly resembled "crafty sciences," which legislators in
both common law and civil law countries had banned for centuries. See Vagrancy
Act of 1824, 5 Geo. 4. c. 83 (U.K.) (providing the most famous in a long line of
"rogue and vagabond" statutes); Witchcraft Act of 1735, 9 Geo. 2 c. 5 (U.K.)
(forbidding both accusations of witchcraft and assertions of witchcraft); Edict du
Roy, Pour la punition de differents crimes, Registr6 en Parlement le 31. Aoust. 1682
(Fr.) (providing Louis XIV's declaration that witchcraft was an impossibility). See
generally BRANDON, supra note 3, at 98-126 (discussing the Spiritualist movement
and its reception in nineteenth century America).
7. Carole Lynne, Crossing the Great Divide: Spirit Communication and Healing
Through Spiritualism, GRIEFANDBELIEF.COM, http://www.griefandbelief.com/carole
lynnel.htm (last visited May 7, 2015).
8. See Katie Wales, Unnatural Conversations in Unnatural Conversations:
Speech Reporting in the Discourse of Spiritual Mediumship, 18 LANG. AND LIT. 347
(2009); see also ROBIN WOOFFITT, THE LANGUAGE OF MEDIUMS AND PSYCHICS: THE
SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF EVERYDAY MIRACLES (2006). Few scholars have studied
the content or rhetoric of Spiritualist speech, in part because such interactions in the
context of actual mediumship (as opposed to "reality shows" such as those such as on
the show Long Island Medium familiar to general audiences) are normally private.
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Some prosecutors and police did not see such messages as
legitimate spiritual guidance or acceptable religious prophecy. They
still labeled such communications as "fortune telling." Under "rogue
and vagabond" statutes, a type of disorderly person legislation
enacted as early as the 1790s in the United States, fortune telling and
similar activities were considered fraudulent, not religious.9 The
statutes defined those who carried them out as "crafty sciences"
practitioners or "rogues and vagabonds,", 0 not members of the
clergy." However, both the ruling in Ballard, and ministerial
One scholar who has studied such private communications is Katie Wales, of the
University of Nottingham, who suggests that mediums use particular speech patterns,
quite importantly, to convey authentication of the messages, as well as to interpret the
messages, if needed.
Likewise, legislatures generally consider fortune telling speech of the kind I
discuss in this Article deceptive, and they have traditionally prohibited it. See State
v. Church, 3 Ohio Dec. Reprint 85, 85 (C.P. Gallia Cnty. 1823). Consider State v.
Church, in which the state prosecuted a fortune teller for "the false pretense of
foreknowing future events, and of telling the fortune of George Badgley ..... Id.
The defendant's attorney asked the jury whether it could truly convict his client based
on the words of the statute. Id. at 90. The jury refused to convict, accepting the
attorney's argument that the legislature had intended to prohibit
high-handed swindling in such instances as the following: If a man
should make his appearance in your town, in the guise of a merchant, and
should relate that he had a large quantity of merchandise at Pittsburgh or
Wheeling, just ready to descend the river; should show false invoices or
bills of lading, and thereon induce one of your citizens to loan him a sum
of money for his exigencies, until he could pass on as far as Louisville,
on urgent business, and thus make off with the booty-or if he should
feign the name of heirship of a large non-resident landholder in your
state, and exhibit false deeds and vouchers, whereby he imposed on the
unwary, and obtained money or property by means of such false and
fraudulent pretenses-and, indeed numerous other cases which could be
mentioned.
Id.
9. See State v. Maier, 99 A.2d 21, 33 (N.J. 1953) (citing to a 1799 law that
categorized "all persons, who shall use, or pretend to use, or have any skill in
physiognomy, palmistry, or like crafty science, or who shall pretend to tell destinies
or fortunes; and all runaway servants or slaves, and all vagrants or vagabonds,
common drunkards, common night walkers, and common prostitutes, shall be
deemed and adjudged to be disorderly persons.").
10. Throughout this Article, for simplicity's sake, I will use the phrase "crafty
sciences practitioners" to refer to fortune tellers, palmisters, astrologers, and the like,
or sometimes simply one group of these practitioners, as I discuss the issues and the
law concerned in this Article.
I1. Legislation generally defines the "crafty sciences" by example, as in this early
twentieth century Chicago ordinance:
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exemptions that state legislatures carved out of statutes before and
after Ballard, protected clergy from accusations of fraud.12
Beginning early in the twentieth century, but in growing numbers
after the Second World War, members of minority religions could
take advantage of ministerial exemptions to protect themselves from a
charge of fraud, even if their activities resembled "crafty sciences"
practices, if they could convince the police or the courts that they
were clergy and the practices they followed were recognized by their
Any person or persons who shall obtain money or property from another
by fraudulent devices and practices in the name of or by means of spirit
mediumship, palmistry, card reading, astrology, seership, or like crafty
science, or fortune-telling of any kind, shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of
not less than $25 nor more than $100 for each offense.
CHICAGO, ILL. CODE § 1988 (1911), invalidated by City of Chicago v. Ross, 100 N.E.
159, 160 (Ill. 1912). The court upheld the ruling of the lower court finding that the
City Council did not have the power to pass the ordinance. Ross, 100 N.E. at 160.
The law is well settled that the legislative powers of the municipalities of
this State are strictly construed, and if there is any fair and reasonable
doubt as to the existence of a power the doubt must be resolved against
the municipality claiming the right to exercise it and the power be held
not to exist . . .. The language found in clause 45 of paragraph 62
authorizing the passage of an ordinance to suppress 'fraudulent devices
and practices' for the purpose of gaining or obtaining money or property,
standing alone, would, perhaps, be ample to authorize the passage of an
ordinance similar to section 1988 [sic] of the municipal code of Chicago.
That language is, however, preceded in the same clause by a grant of
power which is expressed in specific language and which authorizes the
passage of an ordinance suppressing gaming and gambling houses and
lotteries, and which, it is urged, indicates that the legislature, when it
passed clause 45 of paragraph 62, had in mind only the suppression of
gaining and gambling houses and lotteries, and not the condemnation and
punishment of persons who were obtaining money and property by
practicing palmistry, card reading, astrology, spiritual mediumship,
fortune-telling, etc. It is, we think, quite clear that the general language
which provides for the suppression of 'all fraudulent devices and
practices,' and which immediately follows the specific language found in
the statute, must be held to refer to devices and schemes which involve
an element of chance and which are similar to the things designated by
the particular words found in the statute,-that is, gaming, gambling
houses and lotteries,-and not to the practices prohibited by section 1988
[sic] of the municipal code of Chicago.
Id.
12. See, e.g., L.A., CAL., PUB. WELFARE ORDINANCES ch. IV, art. 3, § 43.30
(2015) (prohibiting fortune telling); see also id. art. 43.31 (granting a ministerial
exemption).
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churches. 13
However, crafty sciences practitioners who were not members of
minority religions had more difficulty escaping fraud accusations.
Even if they spoke to willing clients, did not request payment for their
services (and some did not, though some accepted donations), and
performed their services in entertainment venues or in storefronts,
they ran the risk that the police might arrest them and prosecutors
might bring criminal charges against them. State statutes and local
ordinances that banned fortune telling, palmistry, divination,
phrenology,' 4 or other crafty sciences practices offered no defenses
because the First Amendment, as construed at that time, did not
protect such speech.' 5  Law enforcement and prosecutors tended to
bring fewer complaints of outright fraud against Spiritualists after
1945, and shifted their attention to claims of fraud against others who
engaged in the same kinds of practices, including fortune tellers,'6 and
13. See People v. Brossard, 33 N.Y.S.2d 369, 370 (Cnty. Ct. 1942).
14. Phrenology is the study of the structure of the skull from the outside, in
particular the bumps of the skull, in the belief that such study reveals an individual's
character, intelligence, and abilities. The practice was extremely popular in the
nineteenth century. See, e.g., J. D. DAVIES, PHRENOLOGY, FAD, AND SCIENCE: A 19TH
CENTURY AMERICAN CRUSADE (Yale Univ. Press 1955); Pierre Schlag, Commentary,
Law and Phrenology, I10 HARV. L. REV. 877, 887 (1997). IV THE OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 735. ("The theory that the mental powers or
characteristics of an individual consist of separate faculties, each of which has its
location in an organ found in a definite region of the surface of the brain, the size or
development of which is commensurate with the development of the particular
faculty; the study of the external conformation of the cranium as an index to the
position and degree of development of the various faculties.").
15. See, e.g., State v. Kenilworth, 54 A. 244, 245 (N.J. 1903) (noting that "[t]his
provision has been part of our statutory law since June 10, 1799," and should a
defendant present "any rational evidence" that palmistry is a "real science," then that
would suffice to invalidate the statute, but this particular defendant had not succeeded
in doing so). Particularly, if the speech proposed or suggested a transaction, and
most crafty sciences speech did so (either because the speaker tacitly accepted a
donation or overtly requested a fee, or because the client came to the speaker because
of an advertisement), the speech received no protection under the federal or state
constitutions. When crafty science practitioners turned to the First Amendment to
defend themselves against criminal charges, they knew that while Spiritualists and
other religious practitioners could often succeed in obtaining First Amendment
protection because they could claim the protection of the ministerial exemption, non-
clergy knew their own likelihood of success was rather lower. Ministerial
exemptions protect only members of the clergy.
16. See, e.g., People v. Rosenberg, 159 N.Y.S.2d 912 (Magis. Ct. 1957).
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by extension, palmists, clairvoyants, and astrologers.' 7 At the same
time, other minority religious practitioners, emboldened by the
success of the Spiritualists as well as other non-traditional groups,
began to argue that they too should be able to claim the protections of
the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause for practices that included
divination, prophesy, and other "crafty sciences" if those practices
were part of religious rituals.'8
Further, by the 1990s, individuals spurred by the New Age' 9 and
other spiritual movements began to argue that the First Amendment's
Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses should protect believers
whose faith could not be described as "mainstream," and whose
religious principles deviated from the traditional notions of religion
17. Nearly alone among crafty sciences practitioners, astrologers claim to anchor
their work in "science." See, e.g., Rood v. Goodman, 83 F.2d 28, 29 (5th Cir. 1936)
(claiming that postmaster refused to deliver his mail to him in violation of the postal
code).
18. These kinds of arguments eventually convinced the New York State
Legislature, for example, that it should introduce a ministerial exemption. See N.Y.
RELIG. CORP. LAW § 262 passim (McKinney 1918), which covers the organization of
spiritual institutions in New York. In People v. Plaskett, 13 N.Y.S.2d 682 (App. Div.
1939), the court held that Article 13 of the statute covered the incorporation and
organization of spiritualist churches in New York. Plaskett claimed that his church's
certificate of incorporation, and subdivision 3 of New York's Code of Criminal
Procedure Section 899, immunized him from prosecution as a fortune teller.
However, the burden remained on him to demonstrate that practices resembling
fortune telling or other crafty sciences were a genuine part of his church's rituals.
See id. at 683 (defendant's witnesses did not corroborate that his practice of
"prophecy, clairvoyance, clairaudience, trance and other forms of mediumship" were
necessary rituals of Spiritualism).
19 See e.g., AMERICA'S PSYCHIC CHALLENGE, http://www.mylifetime.com/shows
/americas-psychic-challenge (last visited Aug. 7, 2013); LONG ISLAND MEDIUM, http
://www.tlc.com/tv-shows/long-island-medium (last visited Aug. 7, 2013). For a
study of just how different (or similar) Spiritualism mediumship and "New Age"
practices are, see Wayne Spencer, To Absent Friends: Classic Spiritualism
Mediumship and New Age Channelling Compared and Contrasted, 16 J. CONTEMP.
RELIGION 343 (2001). Spencer isolates one real difference: "the presence of tangible
physical beings and phenomena in Spiritualism and their absence in channeling." Id.
at 344. James "the Amazing" Randi, the noted magician and skeptic, has also
identified this difference, although he ascribes the absence of tangible phenomena to
another, altogether more normal (as opposed to paranormal) reason. Telephone
Interview with James Randi, Magician (June 4, 2004).
While the phrase "New Age" means very different things to different people, it
does seem to include, at a minimum, the following beliefs: channeling, belief in some
kind of paranormal or spiritual power that leads to a unified worldview, belief in the
possibility of an alternate or parallel world, and belief in reincarnation or life after
death. See MICHAEL YORK, THE EMERGING NETWORK 42, 46, 50 (1995).
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even more than Spiritualists. Such deviations took the form of
philosophical and ethical principles rather than religious ones.20 In
addition, some persons followed what looked like "crafty sciences"
principles, and engaged in practices that had been labeled for
centuries as fortune telling, astrology, or palmistry. 2 1 By the 1990s,
speakers repackaged these practices and labeled them "New Age" or
generally "spiritual" beliefs.22  Practitioners followed them not in
seedy storefronts but in upscale boutiques. They made successful
First Amendment free speech rather than free exercise claims to
protect speech about the future that, fifty years before, would have
been outside the protection of the First Amendment if it were not
accompanied by a religious label.
Psychics now have reality shows,23 counsel celebrity clients,2 4
and write best-selling books.25 How and why did this change occur?
20. See New Age Spirituality, RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE (last updated May 7, 2011),
http://www.religioustolerance.org/newage.htm.
21. Id.
22. See ROBERT T. CARROLL, Woo-woo, THE SKEPTIC'S DICTIONARY, http://skep
dic.com/woowoo.html (last visited May 7, 2015). Skeptics like James "the
Amazing" Randi call them "woo-woo." Id. "Woo-woo (or just plain woo) refers to
ideas considered irrational or based on extremely flimsy evidence or that appeal to
mysterious occult forces or powers." Id. Exactly what constitutes "fortune telling" is
somewhat difficult to define since both those who practice it and those who report on
it do not agree on the definition. See Taryn Lyon, Beyond the Future: Fortune
Telling as Constituted in the Media, in EDINBURGH RESEARCH ARCHIVE:
PSYCHOLOGY MASTERS THESIS COLLECTION 7-13 (2011) (discussing the different
ways in which news reports and practitioners characterize fortune telling: as business,
as fraud, and as counseling).
23. See generally Long Island Medium, TLC.CoM, http://www.tc.com/tv-
shows/lo ng-island-medium (last visited Aug. 7, 2013) (featuring Theresa Caputo,
who is, according to her website, "a certified medium with the Forever-Family
Foundation-an organization dedicated to connecting science with the afterlife.");
About Me, THERESA CAPUTO, http://www.theresacaputo.com/about-me/ (last visited
Mar. 23, 2014). Another example is Frances Fox, who also advertises her work as a
psychic investigator. See FRANCES Fox PSYCHIC INVESTIGATOR, http://www.Frances
foxpsyc hicrealityshow.com/ (last visited May 7, 2015). Syfy scheduled its own
psychic reality series in 2010 called Maty Knows Best, featuring Long Island
psychic medium Mary Occhino. It appears to have lasted less than one season. See
Maty Knows Best, IMDB.COM, http://www.imdb.com/title/ttl694422/?ref_=fn_altt
I (last visited May 5, 2015).
24. The late Princess Diana (1961-1997) was known to have consulted psychics.
See TIM CLAYTON & PHIL ROGERS, DIANA: STORY OF A PRINCESS 221, 306 (2001)
(describing Diana's visits to psychic Rita Rogers). The news that fonner First Lady
Nancy Reagan allowed an astrologer to help set the President's agenda caused a
ruckus. See Laurence Zuckerman, Nancy Reagan's Astrologer, TIME (May 16,
1988), available at http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,96741 0,00.h
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Why does such speech receive favorable treatment only on some
occasions? Why does the government continue to disfavor, ban, or
limit speech about the supernatural and the paranormal under certain
circumstances? 26 Can the government constitutionally ban or limit
such speech? If so, when and why? If not, why not? Beginning in
the early part of the twentieth century, courts began to rule that
practitioners who could demonstrate that they fit within the definition
of "clergy" could avail themselves of the ministerial exemptions
provided in state statutes that otherwise banned crafty sciences
practitioners. More recently, those practitioners who were not clergy
began to plead successfully that the First Amendment protects their
speech unless the government demonstrates that it is fraudulent.
Because such speech tends to be advice or opinion, fraud is difficult
to prove. 27 To obtain a conviction for crafty sciences practices, the
government must demonstrate that the speaker also has engaged in
criminal activity. Finally, psychics who speak out on television
shows, websites, and other media may use the "for entertainment''
exception in state statutes to protect against prosecution. 28
tml; see also Barrett Seaman, What If Nancy Reagan's Astrologer Had Sued? An
Essay, 27 NOVA L. REV. 277 (2002) (discussing the magazine's receipt and handling
of the information).
25. E.g., JOHN EDWARD, CROSSING OVER: THE STORIES BEHIND THE STORIES
(2010); SYLVIA BROWNE & LINDSAY HARRISON, LIFE ON THE OTHER SIDE (2001);
JAMES VAN PRAAGH. TALKING TO HEAVEN (1999); CONCETTA BERTOLDI, Do DEAD
PEOPLE WATCH YOU SHOWER?: AND OTHER QUESTIONS YOU'VE BEEN ALL BUT
DYING To ASKA MEDIUM (2007); ALLISON DUBOIS, DON'T Kiss THEM GOODBYE
(2005).
26. Some psychics actively attempt to limit critical speech about them and their
activities as well. While a discussion about this kind of psychic activity is beyond the
scope of this particular Article, see Josh Halliday, Daily Mail To Pay £125,000 Libel
Damages Over TV Psychic 'Scam' Claim, THEGUARDIAN.COM (June 20, 2013), http:/
/www.theguardian.com/media/2013/jun/20/daily-mail-libel-damages-tv-psychic.
27. "Even in commercial speech, predictions about future events are fraudulent
only if the speaker knows of facts that will prevent the prediction from coming true."
Rushman v. City of Milwaukee, 959 F. Supp. 1040, 1041 (E.D. Wis. 1977). "In other
words, the law rarely judges the validity of a predictive method." Id. "Especially
because Rushman's speech is not commercial speech, her predictions, perhaps no
better than random guesses, are neither false nor true." Id.
28. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §165.35 (McKinney 1988)
A person is guilty of fortune telling when, for a fee or compensation
which he directly or indirectly solicits or receives, he claims or pretends
to tell fortunes, or holds himself out as being able, by claimed or
pretended use of occult powers, to answer questions or give advice on
personal matters or to exorcise, influence or affect evil spirits or curses;
except that this section does not apply to a person who engages in the
47
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As several federal courts in different circuits have held, under
the First Amendment, the government may not ban speech based on
its content without demonstrating a compelling state interest.29
Additionally, to regulate a crafty sciences practitioner's speech by
aforedescribed conduct as part of a show or exhibition solely for the
purpose ofentertainment or amusement.
Id. (emphasis added).
29. For example, in striking down a Lincoln, Nebraska ordinance that banned
crafty sciences practices, the Eighth Circuit held that
[t]he ordinance is a content-based regulation of speech. As such, it can
be upheld only if it is supported by a compelling state interest. No such
interest appears here. If the citizens of Lincoln wish to have their
fortunes told, or to believe in palm-reading or phrenology, they are free
to do so under our system of government, and to patronize establishments
or 'professionals' who purport to be versed in such arts. Government is
not free to declare certain beliefs-for example, that someone can see
into the future-forbidden. Citizens are at liberty to believe that the
earth is flat, that magic is real, and that some people are prophets.
Argello v. City of Lincoln, 143 F.3d 1152, 1153 (8th Cir. 1998). More recently, the
Maryland Court of Appeals struck down a Montgomery County ordinance that
banned fortune telling "for a fee," holding that it violated the First Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution and the Maryland Declaration of Rights, Article 40, because
fortune telling was not simply commercial speech, the ordinance was not narrowly
tailored, and if fortune telling did cause harm, the county could use other, existing
laws to combat that harm. See Nefedro v. Montgomery County, 996 A.2d 850, 852
(Md. 2010).
Jonathan Varat has noted:
More than twenty years ago my former colleague Steven Shiffrin
suggested that the claim of fortunetellers to free speech protection, even
against government claims to protect people from fraud, presented 'a
significant challenge to the building of first amendment theory.' He was
right, and many courts have since taken heed, invalidating ordinances
banning fortunetelling for pay, unless they are confined to fortunetellers
who know that they are conveying false information or that they lack
the powers they tell others they have. Even such narrowly defined bans
surely would risk unacceptable censorship of belief because of the
difficulty of preventing the inquiry into what the speaker honestly
believed from becoming an inquiry into the validity of the belief itself.
In any event, any law limited to the statement the speaker does not
believe-if properly and precisely applied-would condemn a false
statement of fact about what the beliefs of the speaker were, and leave
fully protected what many would consider the core deceptive opinions or
predictions expressed.
Jonathan D. Varat, Deception and the First Amendment: A Central, Complex, and
Somewhat Curious Relationship, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1111-12 (2006) (footnotes
omitted). Based on the cases discussed in Part II of this Article, a legislature could
punish, at most, (1) the fortune teller who engages in speech that is demonstrably
false or (2) the fortune teller who speaks while having no belief at all in her
paranormal power.
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licensing should be impermissible under the First Amendment
because, although states may license a trade or business based on
content neutral regulations, 30 regulating a legitimate profession based
on the content of the profession's message should not be
permissible. Currently, while members of traditional crafty sciences
professions discuss self-regulation, they do not do so to any great
degree. Nor do states or agencies license or attempt to regulate such
professions as professions.32  Rather, jurisdictions regulate these
activities as businesses, and frequently as businesses with a history of
deception or crime. State or local codes often list fortune tellers,
palmists, astrologers, and similar practitioners in sections reserved for
individuals and businesses involved in sex occupations, gaming, and
pawnshops.33  Those persons engaged in fortune telling or similar
30. States justify their occupational licensing rules as health and safety
requirements. Generally, courts uphold such rules as long as the agencies empowered
to apply the rules do so in a content neutral and non-arbitrary manner. See, e.g., Dent
v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 128 (1889) (upholding a state statute requiring
medical practitioners to obtain a valid medical license). However, in some cases, the
rules seem culturally tainted. Consider the issue of African hair braiding, which in
most states requires a state-issued cosmetology license to perform, even though the
practice does not necessarily require that particular training. Two women have now
filed a federal lawsuit challenging the relevant Missouri statute. See Complaint at 2,
Niang v. Carroll, No. 4:14-cv-01100 (E.D. Mo. June 16, 2014), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/230093313/Hair-braiding-lawsuit.
31. For example, in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1075-76
(1991), the Supreme Court upheld the right of an attorney to speak generally about
his client's case, holding void for vagueness a state bar rule that regulated attorneys'
extra-judicial statements if they posed a substantial threat to the fairness of the
proceedings.
32. One exception is the Astrological Institute of Scottsdale, Arizona, which the
Accrediting Commission of Career Schools and Colleges of Technology accredited in
2001. Astrology School Gets 'Cred,'WIRED MAG. (Aug. 27, 2001), http://www.wire
d.com/culture/lifestyle/news/2001/08/46346; First School of Astrology Is Accredited,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/28/us/first-school-of-
astrology-is-accredited.html. "Judith Eaton, head of the Council for Higher
Education Accreditation in Washington, said the accreditation doesn't validate
astrology, but only recognizes that the school fulfills what it promises its students."
Astrology School Gets 'Cred,' supra. Similarly, Kepler College opened its doors
(physically and virtually) in 2001, intending to offer a college degree program in
astrology. See Robert McClure, Astrology School Sets Off Controversy, SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER (July 22, 2001), http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Astrolog
y-school-sets-off-controversy-1060562.php. But it seems to have abandoned its
attempt to obtain degree accreditation. See About Us, KEPLER COLLEGE, http://www.
kepler.edu/home/index.php/about (last visited May 7, 2015).
33. For example, San Francisco's Fortune Telling Ordinance appears in the Police
Code section, along with the ordinance regulating nude modeling, escort services,
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occupations for entertainment normally qualify for more favorable
treatment. 34
Legislatures and law enforcement are likely to target crafty
sciences speakers, sometimes referred to as practitioners of the
"occult arts," more than other speakers, primarily because of the
traditional link that government perceives between such speech and
fraud and deception. First, they assume that the speech is inherently
deceptive, and second, they assert that because it is delivered "for
profit," either on behalf of some sort of religious organization or the
speaker, it endangers the public welfare because it attacks the listener,
or clients, when they are at their most vulnerable. Third, they assume
the speech itself has low or no value to the listener, and the listener is
always or often, an unwilling or uneducated consumer who requires
protection from the speaker. Both state and federal courts have
repeatedly ruled that crafty sciences speech is protected under the
First Amendment because it is not inherently deceptive and it does
more than propose a commercial transaction.35 I submit that speakers
have the right to speak and hearers have the right to decide whether
they want to listen to such speech. Unless a speaker actually engages
in fraud, the government may not ban the speech, and must license
the speech in the same manner that it would license any other
similarly situated speaker.
Part II of this Article presents a short history of the banning of
crafty sciences speech since 1945, and explains how and why both
state and federal courts have ruled that such bans violate federal and
state constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and religion.
Part III discusses other methods of restricting crafty sciences speech
including licensing, permitting, and zoning. Part IV examines recent
motor vehicles, and police pistols, all areas requiring police intervention. See S.F.,
CAL., POLICE CODE art. 17, div. 1, § 1303 (2003). The ordinance provides
entertainment and ministerial exemptions. Id.
34. William Chambliss examines the history of vagrancy laws in some detail in a
groundbreaking article published in 1964, discussing the effect that plague and
crumbling social structures had on the government's attempts to try to control
wandering populations via the vagrancy and poor laws. William J. Chambliss, A
Sociological Analysis of the Law of Vagrancy, 12 Soc. PROB. 67 (Summer 1964).
Later, Jeffrey S. Adler expanded on his work by adding a legal analysis in A
Historical Analysis ofthe Law of Vagrancy, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 209 (1989).
35. See, e.g., Adams v. City of Alexandria, 878 F. Supp. 2d 685,_690 (W.D. La.
2012); Argello v. City of Lincoln, 143 F.3d 1152, 1153 (8th Cir. 1998); Rushman v.
City of Milwaukee, 959 F. Supp. 1040, 1041 (E.D. Wis. 1977); Trimble v. City of
New Iberia, 73 F. Supp. 2d 659, 666 (W.D. La. 1999).
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attempts to return to bans as a method of controlling crafty sciences
speech and activities. The Article concludes by noting the ways in
which the government may control such speech and activities, and
how the federal and state constitutions may foreclose such control.
II. BANNING "CRAFTY SCIENCES" SPEECH
Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, crafty sciences
practitioners tried to raise both constitutional and other defenses to
combat what they saw as persecution of both religious and
professional activities that came about because of "rogue and
vagabond" legislation. As U.S. society evolved at the end of the
nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, bringing with it
more diverse approaches to religious and cultural life, courts began to
listen more sympathetically to these constitutional claims. At the
same time, some legislatures began to insert ministerial exemptions to
"rogue and vagabond" statutes. However, crafty sciences
practitioners still had difficulty availing themselves of these
exemptions. Eventually, practitioners who realized that they could
not use ministerial exemptions turned to free speech rather than
freedom of religion arguments to protect against prosecution under
"rogue and vagabond" laws.
A. A Short Review ofFree Exercise and Free Speech Jurisprudence
Principles
Discussion of free speech and freedom of religion jurisprudence
occupies hundreds of volumes, so this review is necessarily short.36
When courts review legislation, as they do on the occasions discussed
in this Article, they apply differing standards of review depending on
whether the legislation is content-specific and burdens a First
Amendment (fundamental) right, or whether it is content-neutral. The
Supreme Court holds content-based regulations presumptively
invalid.37 Thus, if the government wishes to defend such a content-
36. For example, the important treatise Smolla and Nimmer on Freedom of
Speech is three volumes by itself. RODNEY A. SMOLLA & MELVILLE B. NIMMER,
SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1994). For a shorter taxonomy and
analysis, see Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25
WM. & MARY L. REv. 189 (1983), and Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Neutral
Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 46 (1987).
37. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd.,
502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991) ("Regulations which permit the Government to
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based measure, the measure "must be narrowly tailored to promote a
compelling Government interest. If a less restrictive alternative
would serve the Government's purpose, the legislature must use that
alternative."38
The Court applies less scrutiny to some categories of content-.
based regulation, one category of which concerns us: commercial
speech. When the Court examines such regulation of commercial
speech, it applies a test developed in Central Hudson v. Public
Service Commission.39 As long as the speech is truthful and concerns
lawful commercial activity, the government's interest in restricting
the speech must be "substantial" and the methods it selects to restrict
the speech must be "in proportion" to that interest.40
In cases in which a content-neutral measure regulates both
speech and conduct, the court applies the O'Brien test, so-called
because the Supreme Court developed it in United States v. O'Brien.4 1
Ruled the Court in O'Brien:
[G]ovemment regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within
the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.42
Content-neutral restrictions limit expression without regard to
the message or the speaker.43 Legislatures and municipalities often
use them, for example, to enforce time, place, and manner
requirements such as zoning ordinances and noise restrictions."
discriminate on the basis of the content of the message cannot be tolerated under the
First Amendment.") (citing Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-649 (1984)).
38. E.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).
39. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
40. Id. at 564.
41. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). The courts have applied the
test in relatively few subsequent cases, but these are among the most famous
speech/conduct cases with which the public is familiar, including Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397 (1989) (the "flag burning" case).
42. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
43. See, e.g., Edwards v. D.C., 765 F. Supp. 2d 3, 18 (D.D.C. 2011) (applying
intermediate scrutiny and upholding licensing requirements for tour guides).
44. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 792 (1989) (holding
that a city ordinance imposing noise control measures in a public forum was content
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Finally, when the government attempts to regulate or ban speech-for-
profit, as opposed to commercial speech, the government must
demonstrate a compelling interest and narrowly tailor the regulation
to reach its goal.4 5  "Telling fortunes or giving advice based on
astrology (without more) is speech-for-profit, not commercial
speech."4  Speakers whose message is the communication are
indulging in speech-for-profit, not commercial speech.
B. The Elements of the Crime: Claiming the Power and Advertising
the Claim
As early as the mid-nineteenth century, one of the issues in
fortune telling cases arose because of a dispute over the meaning of
the word "pretend" in "rogue and vagabond" statutes under which
prosecutors charged both Spiritualists and crafty science practitioners.
Crafty sciences practitioners faced prosecution not simply because
they spoke but because they engaged in activity related to their
speech. Many statutes and ordinances followed a particular formula
in defining the prohibited speech and acts, which included the claims
that the speaker had certain paranormal abilities, that he could
accomplish certain acts, and that he advertised his abilities.
Crafty sciences practitioners quickly raised the defense that
"pretend" in such statutes had an ordinary or everyday meaning.
They claimed that it meant variously that they feigned, imitated, laid
claim to, or otherwise alleged insincerely that they had paranormal or
extraordinary powers of some sort. For example, the defendant in
People v. Elmer contended that "pretend" had an ordinary meaning-
it meant that while some crafty science practitioners might "pretend"
or claim that they had a supernatural power and even if they did not,
he in fact did have the power to foretell the future.4 7  Because
"pretending" meant "claiming falsely," if he truly had the power and
could demonstrate it, he was not violating the statute. Thus, if one
really has a supernatural power, then one should not be convicted
neutral, reasonably tailored to achieve city's legitimate purpose to protecting public
from unwanted noise, and did not violate the First Amendment).
45. Rushman v. City of Milwaukee, 959 F. Supp. 1040, 1044 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
46. Id. at 1043.
47. People v. Elmer, 67 N.W. 550, 550 (Mich. 1896).
48. Id.
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under a statute that generally prohibits fortune telling.49 The court
pointed out that because the defendant admitted the facts of the case
at trial, and the law permitted no defense, the guilty verdict followed
as a matter of law.50 Even if Elmer had gone to trial, his attempt to
explain and excuse his actions by arguing that he really had
paranormal powers would have been futile.5' In later cases, courts
49. Fortune telling speech of the kind discussed in this Article, and which
legislatures have routinely prohibited, is likewise the kind that the public easily
recognizes. Prior to 1848, the year to which historians date the birth of Spiritualism,
prosecutors brought fortune telling cases under "rogue and vagabond" or vagrancy
statutes and usually obtained convictions. However, some well-spoken or
particularly effective defense attorneys, able to explain statutory construction to
juries, could obtain acquittals for their clients. Consider the 1823 case of State v.
Church, 3 Ohio Dec. Reprint 85 (C.P. Gallia Cnty. 1823), in which the state
prosecuted a fortune teller for "the false pretense of foreknowing certain events, and
of telling the fortune of George Badgley," and for telling him that he would find the
wallet that he had lost. Id. at 85. The defendant's attorney asked the jury whether it
could truly convict his client based on the words of the statute. Id. at 90. The jury
refused to convict, accepting the attorney's argument that the legislature had intended
to prohibit "high-handed swindling." Id. By contrast, in Blener v. People, 67 N.W.
550 (111. 1875), the State of Illinois argued that the defendant "by a certain game or
device" defrauded a third party. Id. at 550. One could theoretically differentiate
fraud using a "device by the use of cards" from fortune telling speech, even in the
nineteenth century. Id. However, despite the defense attorney's argument that the
prosecution had violated procedural rules, the appellate court affirmed the conviction.
Id.
50. Elner, 67 N.W. at 550.
5 1. See id.
It is idle to attempt to draw distinctions between professing to possess a
power and pretending to exercise that power. This respondent did both.
The precise point is decided in Penny v. Hanson .. .. The English
statute, under which conviction was had, provided that 'every person
pretending or professing to tell fortunes . . . shall be deemed a rogue and
a vagabond.' . . . The circular upon which the respondent was convicted
advertised that, 'by the positions of the planets in the nativity, and their
aspects to each other,' he was enabled to forecast future events . . . .No
person who was not a lunatic could believe he [the respondent] possessed
such power . .. The advertisement and circular amounted to a pretending
and profession to tell fortunes. This language is especially applicable to
this case. No sane, intelligent juror could come to any other conclusion
than that reached by the circuit judge . . . . No intent was involved. The
offense was a misdemeanor. In such cases, when the facts are admitted
or undisputed, it is the duty of courts to instruct juries that the facts
proven constitute the offense. There was no question of fact for the jury
to pass upon. The conclusion is one of law . . . Guilt follows, as a matter
of law....
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ruled that legislatures passed such statutes because they had made a
determination that the acts claimed were, in fact, impossible to
complete. Thus, any person "pretending" (claiming) to be able to
52
accomplish them could not offer a defense.
Similarly, legislatures generally prohibited the advertising of
claims such as those in the Elmer case.s3 Other state supreme courts
seized on the Elmer court's reasoning to uphold similar statutes.
Such wording in "rogue and vagabond" statutes is still in use today.55
C. Advancing a Successful First Amendment Freedom ofReligion
Defense
Beginning in the early part of the twentieth century, state
legislatures began to insert ministerial exemptions into their "rogue
and vagabond" statutes. Such exemptions allowed clergy, including
members of non-traditional denominations, like Spiritualism, to argue
that practices such as prophecy and divination were protected as part
of religious worship.56 While these statutes seemed to dispose of the
Id. The Elmer court adopted its reasoning from the British courts which had long
rejected defenses like the one Elmer offered here. Numerous American state courts
have also rejected the defense.
52. People v. Ashley, 172 N.Y.S. 282, 286 (App. Div. 1918) (quoting New York
v. Malcolm, 154 N.Y.S. 914, 915 (Cnty. Ct. 1915)).
53. See Elmer, 67 N.W. at 550; see also City of St. Louis v. Hellscher, 242 S.W.
652, 652 (Mo. 1922).
54. See e.g., People v. Malcolm, 154 N.Y.S. 919, 919 (Crim. Ct. 1915); Davis v.
State, 160 N.E. 473, 476 (Ohio 1928).
55. See infra text accompanying note 360; see also CHESTERFIELD CNTY., VA.,
CODE ch. 6, art. I, § 6-1 (2014) (defining fortune tellers as well as other crafty
sciences practitioners as "any person or establishment engaged in the occupation of
occult sciences, including a fortune-teller, palmist, astrologist, numerologist,
clairvoyant, craniologist, phrenologist, card reader, spiritual reader, tea leaf reader,
prophet, psychic or advisor or who in any other manner claims or pretends to tell
fortunes or claims or pretends to disclose mental faculties of individuals for any form
of compensation). A spiritual counselor challenged the ordinance under the First
Amendment and the federal Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA), unsuccessfully alleging that the county had infringed her constitutional
and statutory religious rights. Moore-King v. Cnty. of Chesterfield, 819 F. Supp. 2d
604, 611-612 (E.D. Va. 2011), aff'd, 708 F.3d 560 (5th Cir. 2013). It is not clear to
what extent those who claim the mantle of spiritual counselor actually consider the
extent to which they might be liable for their advice to clients under the law. Cf
RONALD K. BULLIs, SACRED CALLING, SECULAR ACCOUNTABILITY: LAW AND ETHICS
IN COMPLEMENTARY AND SPIRITUAL COUNSELING 7-15 (1st ed. 2001) (providing
some discussion of these issues).
56. See, e.g., People v. Rosenberg, 159 N.Y.S. 2d 912, 914-915 (Mag. Ct. 1957)
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issue of whether practices that were banned would be permissible if
engaged in by religious individuals, they still raised the question of
whether those individuals were breaking the law if money changed
hands.
1. Illinois and Nebraska Lead the Way
As early as 1911, an Illinois appellate court found a Chicago
municipal ordinance unconstitutional because although it seemed to
aim at preventing vagrancy, it infringed on religious practice. 7 The
ordinance in question forbade the practice of "spirit mediumship" or
other crafty sciences for material gain.58  The court ruled that in
passing such an ordinance, the Chicago City Council certainly did not
intend to criminalize spiritualist activities. 5 9
[Tihis subdivision shall not be construed to interfere with the belief,
practices or usages of an incorporated ecclesiastical governing body or
the duly licensed teachers or ministers thereof acting in good faith and
without personal fee, nor shall it be construed to prohibit or prevent any
show, trick, feat, display or other act or exhibition, performed by a
magician or mentalist for the purpose of amusement or entertainment and
without personal fee.
Id. (citing N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 899 (McKinney 1929) (amended 1949).)
57. City of Chicago v. Payne, 160 Ill. App. 641, 641 (App. Ct. 1911).
58. Id.
Section 2. That any person or persons who shall obtain money or property
from another by fraudulent devices and practices in the name of or by means
of spirit mediumship, palmistry, card reading, astrology, seership, or like
crafty science, or fortune telling of any kind, shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor and on conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not less
than twenty-five ($25) dollars nor more than one hundred ($100) dollars for
each offense. Section 3. That any person or persons who shall hold or give
any public or private meeting, gathering, circle or seance of any kind in the
name of spiritualism, or of any other religious body, cult or denomination,
and therein practice or permit to be practiced fraud or deception of any kind,
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be
punished by a fine of not less than twenty-five ($ 25) dollars nor more than
one hundred ($ 100) dollars for each offense.
Id.
59. Id. at 642.
We do not think that the common council of the city of Chicago...
intended to declare such belief unfounded and make the act of a.
professed medium, who claimed to hold intercourse with departed spirits,
for reward, a misdemeanor punishable by fine, nor that by section 3 of
the ordinance the council intended to make the holding of a meeting in
the name of spiritualism, at which a professed medium claimed to hold
intercourse with departed spirits, a misdemeanor punishable by fine.
Id.
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Sixty years later, in the 1978 Illinois case Village of Schaumburg
v. Petke, a defendant again attacked the constitutionality of a
municipal ordinance that banned fortune telling for a fee.6 The
Schaumburg Village ordinance, which resembled many U.S. city
ordinances, outlawed all crafty science practices for any kind of
payment.6 Having lost at the trial court level, the defendant appealed
arguing that the complaining witness's offer of a $10 donation did not
constitute fortune telling 'for a fee' in contravention of the ordinance,
and that her tarot card reading "was a religious activity protected by
the first amendment to the United States Constitution." 62  The
appellate court found that insufficient evidence existed to uphold the
conviction and thus that it did not need to reach the constitutional
question.6 3  Nevertheless, it noted that courts had found similar
Chicago ordinances unconstitutional, most notably in 1911 in City of
Chicago v. Payne.6 Further, the court stated that the Schaumburg
ordinance prohibited card reading only if the prosecution could also
demonstrate fraud because it included the phrase "by fraudulent
devices and practices."6 Thus, "the ordinance neither prohibits card
reading in itself, nor declares that card reading is a fraudulent device
or practice. The ordinance requires proof of fraud independent of the
mere performance of the act of card reading to establish a
60. Villiage of Schaumburg v. Petke, 373 N.E.2d 716, 718 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978).
61. Id. at 717 ("It shall be unlawful for any person to obtain money or property
from another by fraudulent devices and practices in the name of, or by means of,
spirits, mediumship, palmistry, card reading, astrology, seership or like crafty science
or fortune telling of any kind."). Currently, the Village of Schaumburg defines,
regulates and licenses fortune tellers under Title I1, Chapter 129A of its Municipal
Code.
62. Petke, 373 N.E.2d at 718.
63. Id.
64. Id. In City of Chicago v. Payne, 160 Ill. App. 641, 642-43 (App. Ct. 1911),
the court invalided a city ordinance that it deemed ultimately aimed at religious
practice, not at vagrancy.
We do not think that the common council of the city of Chicago ...
intended to declare such belief unfounded and make the act of a
professed medium, who claimed to hold intercourse with departed spirits,
for reward, a misdemeanor punishable by fine, nor that by section 3 of
the ordinance the council intended to make the holding of a meeting in
the name of spiritualism, at which a professed medium claimed to hold
intercourse with departed spirits, a misdemeanor punishable by fine.
Id.
65. See Peike, 373 N.E.2d at 718.
57
2014]
THOMAS JEFFERSON LAW REVIEW
violation."6
In the 1940 Nebraska case of Dill v. Hamilton, the plaintiffs
challenged a state statute that prohibited public s6ances "for gain,"
arguing that the law effectively infringed on their First Amendment
right to practice their religion. They requested a declaratory
judgment,
declaring their right to worship God according to their
religious beliefs, tenets of faith, ceremonies and rituals,
including spiritualistic s6ances, and also declaring the law to
be such as to prevent defendants, who are prosecuting
executive and judicial officers, from interfering with the
religious freedom and the devotional exercises of plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs challenged the application of the statute in
particular because it forbade "'all public exhibitions of hypnotism,
mesmerism, animal magnetism, or so-called psychical forces, for
gain . . . .'" First, the majority carefully interpreted this statute as
content neutral, noting that no specific prohibition existed on
"spiritualistic seances, unless they are public and open and for
gain."69 The court also stated that the legislature had not labeled
s6ances as criminal, but had criminalized "public exhibition of
religious worship in the form of a s6ance, for gain, on the stage or at a
carnival, fair, circus, or show . . ." since the Federal Constitution did
not protect such performances. o
66. Id.
67. Dill v. Hamilton, 291 N.W. 62, 63 (Neb. 1940).
68. Id. at 62.
69. Id.
70. Id.
Spiritualistic seances are not of themselves denounced by the lawmakers
as criminal. The making of a public exhibition of religious worship in the
form of a s6ance for gain on the stage or at a carnival, fair, circus, or
show is not a religious liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. The police
power to prohibit public exhibitions for money-making purposes or 'for
gain' extends to harmful, immoral, or indecent performances, though
conducted in the name of religion. These are evils against which the
statute is directed. Persons or members of any organization or society
committing such offenses are amenable to the law and subject to
prosecution and punishment.
Id. Interestingly, the sort of "debunking" demonstrations through which Harry
loudini attempted to educate the public about how Spiritualist seances were faked
would have been illegal under this statute if he accepted payment for the
demonstrations. See Houdini and the Supernatural, HOUDINI: His LIFE AND His ART,
http://www.thegreatharnyhoudini.comn/occult.htmin (last visited May 7, 2015).
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The majority further pointed out that in order for the court to
find the defendant guilty, the prosecution had to show that the
defendant had performed the act (1) in public, (2) openly, and (3) for
gain.7 However, the question Dill presented was whether, under the
statute, the $15 given to him for a spiritualistic s6ance constituted the
sort of enrichment contemplated "within the meaning of the statute
forbidding public s6ances for gain."72 The Nebraska Supreme Court
held that "gain" did not include the voluntary donation in this case
within the meaning of the statute, reasoning that this type of
gathering was not the harm that the legislature sought to prevent.74
The key was the finding that the plaintiffs obtained the money
voluntarily from attendees; that is, they did not engage in commercial
transactions.7 s
The question still remained: was the link between speech about
fortune telling, related subjects, and activities, even if they were
clearly part of a religious doctrine, sufficiently dangerous to the
public well-being that a legislative body ought to, be able to prohibit
any gain accompanying them? Or did the protections of the First
Amendment shield the speech and activity to the extent that the
"gain" (if it were in the form of donations) was also shielded? If so,
then the legislature still need to resolve the question of how to treat
''crafty sciences" speech and activity that was essentially similar but
was not religious. In addition, it needed to consider the question of
gain related to the speech and activity. What continued to underlie
crafty sciences legislation was the concern that the government
71. Dill,291 N.W. at 64.
72. Id. at 63.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 65.
A statute authorizing imprisonment for violations of its provisions
imposes no restrictions on conduct except those specifically enumerated
in the legislative act. The act to prohibit 'all public exhibitions of
hypnotism, mesmerism, animal magnetism, or so-called psychical forces,
for gain,' does not prohibit spiritualistic seances, unless they are public
and open and for gain .... The words 'psychical forces' as used by the
lawmakers apply to a seance conducted by a spiritualistic medium, but
his act as such does not violate the statute unless it is 'public' and 'open'
and 'for gain.'
Id. (citing Act to Prohibit All Public Exhibitions of Hypnotism, Mesmerism, Animal
Magnetism, or so-called Psychical Forces, For Gain, ch. 182, sec. 1, §128-1111, 1911
Neb. Laws 1929).
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should protect uneducated or innocent members of the public from
deceptive or fraudulent persons. The link between secular crafty
sciences speakers seemed completely clear to many legislators and
members of law enforcement.
2. New York Examines the Issue and Georgia Responds
In 1943, a New York court had the opportunity to rule on the
question of whether the ministerial exemption provided for in the
New York Penal Code could extend to Spiritualist practice. Miller,
a practicing Spiritualist, took written questions from attendees at
s6ances; all donations from the attendees went to the church.n At
issue was Miller's good faith. Miller pled the ministerial exemption
as a defense, but the judge in the case, Francis Giaccone, considered
First Amendment freedom of religion claims and a presumption of
innocence claim as well. 79 He handed down a judgment in her favor,
stating, "She is supported in her trial by the principles and traditions
of our democratic form of government, which leave untrammeled and
untouched the right to the individual to observe her faith according to
the dictates of her own conscience.,s The Mirsberger decision,
coming a year before Ballard and during a war for human dignity and
human rights, coupled with earlier decisions in favor of Spiritualists
in the Illinois and Nebraska courts, is a recognition that the First
Amendment protects "crafty sciences practices" if they are associated
with accepted religions. Less than a year later, in People v. Strong, a
New York appellate court reversed the conviction of another
Spiritualist under the same Penal Code provision.8 '
The New York State Legislature attempted to solve the "for a
fee" problem as well. In Pellman v. Valentine, several cabaret
employees sued the New York City Police Commissioner when he
refused to issue them identification cards allowing them to continue
their nightclub act, which included "character reading." 82  The
employees claimed that the Police Commissioner was without
authority to prohibit them from engaging in what was a lawful
76. People ex rel. Mirsberger v. Miller, 46 N.Y.S.2d 206 (Magis. Ct. 1943).
77. Id. at 207.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 209.
80. Id. at 208.
81. People v. Strong, 63 N.E.2d I19(N.Y. 1945).
82. Pellman v. Valentine, 57 N.Y.S. 2d 617, 617 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
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occupation, that of "character analysis or character reading, whether
by palmistry or any other method... .". They alleged that
"character analysis" was not fortune telling.8 The Police
Commissioner retorted that a fortune teller by any other name was
still a fortune teller and that Penal Code section 899 prohibited their
occupation. 8 Justice Benvenga ruled that the five employees had
presented a triable issue of fact.86  The legislature had prohibited
fortune telling because "[s]uch an occupation is unlawful, and any
person who practices it is a disorderly person and punishable as such.
But a person who merely practices character reading or character
analysis is not a disorderly person."
In 1949, the New York State Legislature further amended the act
to exempt professional magicians, "mentalists," and entertainers, who
claim to read minds for the purposes of entertainment during a cabaret
or other theatrical or stage performance:8 8
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. The city had also prosecuted an astrologer under this section in 1914. See
People ex rel. Preiss v. Adams, 32 N.Y. Crim. Rep. 326 (Crim. Ct. 1914). This
section is now N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.35 (McKinney 1967).
86. Is It Fortune Telling? Court Rules Trial Must Decide Status of Character
Reading, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 1, 1945, at 21.
87. Valentine, 57 N.Y.S. 2d at 620.
88. Entertainers have made such good use of the exemption that writers of films
and television commonly refer to it in popular culture, particularly through the
activities of characters who present themselves as mentalists or psychics but who
admit they have no paranormal abilities. The current CBS television series The
Mentalist features a main character, a former "psychic," Patrick Jane. After the
character "Red John" murders Jane's wife and daughter, Jane decides to use his
skills to assist law enforcement to solve crimes. The show seems to postulate that
real psychics, if they exist at all, are extremely rare. Rather, most individuals who
claim to have paranormal abilities simply use the same abilities as does Jane. He is
simply more skilled than they are. Essentially, he acts as an expert witness. See The
Mentalist (CBS television broadcast 2008-2015). Similarly, the USA series Psych,
although lighter in tone, puts forward the same message. The main character Shawn
Spencer, trained in observation and critical thinking by his police officer father
Henry, chooses not to follow Henry's career path, instead pretending to be a
"psychic" and a "mentalist" even though as his partner and best friend Burton "Gus"
Guster often points out, he doesn't often observe the differences between the two.
Since this show is pure fiction, Spencer and Guster work on commission for the
Santa Barbara Police Department. Psych (USA Network television broadcast 2006-
2014). Real police departments do not habitually have psychics on retainer. See Jane
Ayers Sweat & Mark W. Dunn, Psychics: Do Police Departments Really Use Them?,
SKEPTICAL INQUIRER, Winter 1993, at 148 (indicating that while police may use
psychics to some degree, the researchers who conducted this survey did not uncover
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[T]his subdivision shall not be construed to interfere with the
belief, practices or usages of an incorporated ecclesiastical
governing body or the duly licensed teachers or ministers
thereof acting in good faith and without personal fee, nor
shall it be construed to prohibit or prevent any show, trick,
feat, display or other act or exhibition, performed by a
magician or mentalist for the purpose of amusement or
entertainment and without personal fee. 89
By 1952, New York City officials had resorted to the newly
enacted subdivision of Penal Code section 722 to prosecute
confidence artists and swindlers.9 This .particular amendment
addressed the behavior of persons traditionally known as "vagrants."
The legislation thus belonged to that type of statute generally classed
as "rogue and vagabond"9' and later vagrancy laws.92 In a case of
first impression, the court of appeals interpreted the language of this
subdivision to allow a conviction if the accused merely intended to
defraud.93  The fraud need not have occurred, nor need the victim
actually have been misled.94 The basis for the provision is the need to
evidence that most police departments used psychics routinely or found them
particularly effective); see also Christine A. Corcos, Prosecutors and Psychics on the
Air: Does a "Psychic Detective Effect" Exist?, in LAW AND JUSTICE ON THE SMALL
SCREEN 173 (Jessica Silbey & Peter Robson, eds., 2012) (discussing the popular
culture influence of psychics on the legal system).
89. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 899 (McKinney 1949). People ex rel. Emuru v.
Rosenberg, 159 N.Y.S.2d 912, 912 (Magis. Ct. 1957). ("Historically, the statute in
question, originally, was contained in the Revised Statutes and ultimately found its
way into the body of the present code. It was amended in 1929, and thereafter further
amended in 1949 (ch. 803, eff. April 25, 1949), so as to take from the orbit of its
applicability, insofar as penal offenses are concerned, the acts performed by
magicians or ientalists, for the purpose of amusement and entertainment and
without personal fee.").
90. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 722 (McKinney 1952).
91. See Chambliss, supra note 34, at 72-74 (discussing the history of rogue and
vagabond laws).
92. I have not found a comprehensive study of vagrancy statutes in the United
States. But see Adler, supra note 34, at 216.
93. People v. Yonko, 115 N.Y.S.2d 560, 564 (Magis. Ct. 1952).
94. A great part of the reason for the change was that, as the court pointed out,
under the prior statute, the victim had to file a complaint in order for the prosecutor to
bring charges. "This procedure was not only cumbersome, but in many events
fruitless." Id. at 564. Such victims were often too embarrassed to come forward and
admit that the defendants had swindled them. Id. The new legislative provision,
which allowed police officers the power of immediate arrest, offered much swifter
enforcement and the opportunity to substitute the police as complaining witnesses.
Id.
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protect the public from deception (whether or not the individual in the
case actually was misled). The New York court held that the statute's
language was analogous to similar provisions in the Code of Criminal
Procedure and the Penal Law, which allowed prosecution of thieves,
vagrants, and loiterers in public areas if these persons were "unable to
give a reasonable explanation of their presence . . . ."95
The defendant alleged that the statute was unconstitutional since
it was both vague and imprecise in terms of the crimes that it
prohibited.9 6 The court noted that other states had similar statutes,97
but such a response is not a particularly persuasive constitutional
argument. The court gave further weight to the prosecution's
evidence that the defendant attempted to obtain money not through
the means specified in the indictment, but through "any other illegal
manner," specifically fortune telling, which the legislature had made
illegal under section 899, subdivision 3 of the New York Code of
Criminal Procedure. Because that particular section requires that the
complaining witness bring the charge, it is less effective than section
722, which allows the police to intervene before the harm occurs.98 In
order to give effect to the legislature's intent, the court was willing to
95. Id. at 562-63.
The verbiage 'or who stations. himself in any place, or follows or accosts
any person for the purpose of obtaining money or other property from
said person' finds its counterpart in Section 887, subdivs. 4 and 10, of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, relating to vagrants, Section 898-a of the
same Code relating to professional thieves and Section 722, subdiv. 11,
of the Penal Law. dealing with consorting of professional criminals.
Similar legislation is also found in Section 1990-a of the Penal Law
relating to those loitering about any toilet, stations or station platforms of
a subway or elevated railway or railroad who being unable to give a
reasonable explanation of their presence are guilty of an offense.
Id.
96. Id. at 565.
97. Id. at 563.
A comparison of this new subdivision with other statutes of our State is
bolstered by comparison with statutes of other states throughout the
country. In Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Missouri,
Montana, Oklahoma, Texas and Wisconsin, there are statutes prohibiting
the obtaining or attempting to obtain money by means of a confidence
game, or by cheating or swindling.
Id.
98. Id. at 565-66.
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grant the magistrate a great deal of discretion in interpreting the
police officers' conduct as legitimate under the statute.
The court dismissed the defendant's complaint that fortune
telling for hire is not in the same "general class, family or relationship
as the specific words" of the crimes listed in subdivision 6 of the
statute under which she was charged, ruling that the legislature's
intent was "to broaden the use of the specific words, 'trick,
etc . . . ."' If the defendant engaged in fortune telling, she engaged
in obtaining money in an illegal manner, therefore trickery, and was
guilty.' 0' While New York prosecutors had previously tried to use
99. Id. at 564.
In order to preserve law, order and ordinary decency in so large a
metropolis as the City of New York, conduct which tends to a breach of
the peace is within certain limitations a matter of discretion on the part of
the magistrate. The standard is that of the average member of the
community observing the current morality. An actual breach of the
peace need not occur or the person affected by the defendant's conduct
need not be actually annoyed. If the defendant's behavior is such that it
might be resented, either forcibly or by loud and boisterous action,
regardless of.what action, in fact, is taken by those subjected to it, then
there is conduct tending to a breach of the peace, or by which a breach of
the peace may be occasioned.
Id.
100. Id. at 565-66.
101. Id. at 564-66.
She invokes the rule of 'ejusdem generis' Book 1, McKinney's Statutes,
§ 239. This doctrine requires no more than that all things contemplated
by the general language following the use of the particular words be of
the same class as the particular thing specified. This section, 239, is
merely an aid to be utilized in ascertaining the meaning of the statute
when its language is ambiguous and should be applied to accomplish the
legislative intent, not to defeat it. Like wills or other documents, statutes
should be construed to carry out the objects sought to be accomplished.
If the language of a statute indicates that other things than those
mentioned are intended to be included within the operation, the rule of
'ejusdem generis' will not necessarily require their exclusion, but in such
a case the intention to the contrary must be discernible from the context
of the act itself. Sec. 240, McKinney's Statutes, Book 1. The context of
Subd. 6 does not disclose any intention to the contrary, in actuality it
clearly indicates no exclusion or limitation. By the use of the words 'any
other,' an intention to broaden the use of the specific words, 'trick, etc.'
is discernible. The word 'other,' is a collective term and if that was the
only word used it would have only strengthened but not exceeded the
original outline, that is, it would not have broadened the specific words.
The words 'any other' give the clause a broader application and tends to
show an intent by the legislature to broaden, not limit, the specific words.
... When there is fortune telling for hire there is then an obtaining of
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Penal Code section 899102 against crafty science practitioners, they
had been unsuccessful in those cases in which the defendant had
successfully pled the ministerial exemption.' 0 3
Practitioners who claimed to be entertainers often fell afoul of
anti-crafty sciences laws because they could not argue that they had
religious motivations, and they charged or accepted fees for their
activities. The defendant in People v. Rosenberg claimed to be
innocent of the charge of fortune telling for a fee, not because she
came within any exemption provided for under the statute, but
because she provided "character reading" for entertainment purposes
only.'0 She alleged that her "character readings" did not represent
"telling or prediction of the future" and that she "requested or
charged" no fee. 05 Thus, she argued, she came within the spirit of
the statute, whether or not she came within the specific limited
exemptions provided.1" The court examined the policy reasons for
which the legislature enacted the statute:
[A]n analysis of the statute, its prime social objective, and the
reason for its enactment and enforcement, leads the court to
the irresistible conclusion that the purpose, amongst other
things, for which the statute was brought into esse, was to
prevent the ignorant and the gullible, as well as the curious,
money in an illegal manner. Subd. 3, § 899, Code of Crim.Proc. While
it is not in the same general class as the specific words of the subdivision
under consideration, it does come under the banner of the general words,
'or in any other illegal manner'."
Id.
102. This section is now New York Consolidated Laws Penal Law article 165.35.
It reads
[a] person is guilty of fortune telling when, for a fee or compensation
which he directly or indirectly solicits or receives, he claims or pretends
to tell fortunes, or holds himself out as being able, by claimed or
pretended use of occult powers, to answer questions or give advice on
personal matters or to exorcise, influence or affect evil spirits or curses;
except that this section does not apply to a person who engages in the
aforedescribed conduct as part of a show or exhibition solely for the
purpose of entertainment or amusement. Fortune telling is a class B
misdemeanor.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.35 (McKinney 2014).
103. See Corcos, supra note 53, at 59.
104. People ex rel. Emuru v. Rosenberg, 159 N.Y.S. 2d 912, 912 (Magis. Ct.
1957).
105. Id.
106. See id.
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from being ensnared by the guiles and the fantasies of those
who profess, be it for alleged innocent intentions in regard to
this form of activity. The mere doing of the act, under the
circumstances, whether well-intentioned or not, if done, is
sufficient for a finding by the court that the statute has been
violated.I0 7
Neither did the court view the payment of a fee as material to the
question of whether the defendant was innocent or guilty. The evil
the legislature sought to prevent was the act of fortune telling. In this
case, the legislature attempted to regulate or prevent fraud via the
criminal arena without falling afoul of the First Amendment:
Were the payment of a fee of any substance, the statute, in
plain language, would have so specifically provided, and the
burden thereof would have been cast upon the People to
prove the same as part of its affirmative case. It is not
difficult to understand when one views the broad perspective
of the beneficent social objectives of the statute and the evils
sought to be curtailed thereby, that the payment of a fee,
under the facts disclosed herein, is inconsequential and
collateral to the issue of guilt or innocence of violation of the
law in question. 0 8
Similarly, in the 1954 Georgia case Williams v. Jenkins, Dianne
Williams attempted to raise the defense that the city of Atlanta
violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by convicting her
of practicing crafty sciences in violation of a city ordinance.'0 The
Georgia Supreme Court said:
The prisoner has utterly failed to show wherein the ordinance
is void. Of course, she assumes, without showing any fact to
authorize the assumption, that fortune-telling is a legitimate
calling, untarnished with fraud or other qualities which the
city could lawfully render illegal by ordinance, and from this
premise she concludes that she is being denied the protection
of the 14th amendment of the Federal Constitution and due
process of law and free speech as guaranteed by the State
Constitution. 110
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Williams v. Jenkins, 83 S.E.2d 614, 616 (Ga. 1954).
110. Id.
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However, it opined that, while it might not know whether
fortune telling is a legitimate practice, it did not need to ascertain its
legitimacy in order to determine whether the ordinance was valid.
"However strongly as individuals we may believe fortune-telling is a
fake and a fraud upon all who patronize it, we would be slow to say
judicially that it is such.""' But, it continued,
The action was to secure the release from custody after trial,
conviction, and sentence for a violation of a city ordinance
which, in substance, provides that it shall be unlawful to
practice within the city the calling or profession of fortune-
teller or astrologer. Since, as stated above, we do not
judicially know enough about fortune-telling to render
judgment on its merits, the ordinance appears to be valid.
Indeed, the ordinance is presumed to be valid.112
On this point the court pointed to Georgia law, but on the
question of the legitimacy of fortune telling as a profession, the court
looked to prior case law in other jurisdictions, citing not only the
English Vagrancy Act of 1824, but also Gladstone v. Gallon,"' State
v. Neitzel,Il4 Davis v. Ohio,"'5 and Mitchell v. Birmingham," all
upholding various state laws and ordinances." 7 "These laws at least
support the validity of the ordinance in question, and we have found
none holding it invalid.""'8  The court at least engaged Williams'
argument, also raised in Davis v. Ohio," 9 that fortune telling is a
lawful occupation. The court stated:
[S]he assumes, without showing any fact to authorize the
assumption, that fortune-telling is a legitimate calling,
untarnished with fraud or other qualities which the city could
lawfully render illegal by ordinance, and from this premise
she concludes that she is being denied the protection of the
14 amendment of the Federal Constitution and due process
of law and free speech as guaranteed by the State
Constitution .... On the other hand, she ignores the fact that
111. Id. at 615.
112. Id.
113. Gladstone v. Galton, 145 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1940).
114. State v. Neitzel, 125 P. 939 (Wash. 1912).
115. Davis v. State, 159 N.E. 575 (Ohio Ct. App. 1927).
116. Mitchell v. City of Birmingham, 133 So. 13 (Ala. 1931).
117. Jenkins, 83 S.E.2d at 616.
118. Id.
119. Davis, 159 N.E. at 577.
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200 years ago Parliament enacted a law making fortune-
telling a misdemeanor (9 Geo. II, Cap. V); that our own
legislature ... expressly authorized cities to prohibit fortune-
telling ... .120
In some states, the war between prosecutors and practitioners
continued for decades. In California, a Los Angeles city ordinance
became the focus of a protracted battle. The ordinance prohibited
speech, activity, and advertising of crafty sciences practices.121 The
ministerial exception is the only one provided.1 2 2
120. Jenkins, 83 S.E.2d at 616. The statute the court refers to here is, curiously,
not the Vagrancy Act but the Witchcraft Act of 1735. The court may have been
referring to the recent prosecutions of Helen Duncan (1944), Jane Rebecca Yorke
(1950), and Charles Botham (1950). The court seems to have been unaware of the
two earlier New York cases, People ex rel. Mirsberger v. Miller, 46 N.Y.S.2d 206
(Magis. Ct. 1945), and People v. Strong, 63 N.E.2d 119 (N.Y. 1945).
121. The ordinance provides:
No person shall advertise by sign, circular, handbill or in any
newspaper, periodical, or magazine, or other publication or
publications, or by any other means, to tell fortunes, to find or restore
lost or stolen property, to locate oil wells, gold or silver or other ore or
metal or natural product; to restore lost love or friendship, to unite or
procure lovers, husbands, wives, lost relatives or friends, for or without
pay, by means of occult or psychic powers, faculties, forces, crafts or
sciences, including clairvoyance, spirits, mediumship, seership,
prophecy, astrology, palmistry, necromancy, cards, talismans, charms,
potions, magnetism or magnetized articles or substances, oriental
mysteries, magic of any kind or nature, or numerology. No person shall
engage in or carry on any business the advertisement of which is
prohibited by this section.
L.A., CAL., PUB. WELFARE ORDINANCES ch. IV, art. 3, § 43.30 (2015)
122. The ministerial exception provides:
The provisions of the preceding section shall not be construed to include,
prohibit or interfere with the exercise of any religious or spiritual
function of any priest, minister, rector or an accredited representative of
any bona fide church or religion where such priest, minister, rector or
accredited representative holds a certificate of credit, commission or
ordination under the ecclesiastical laws of a religious corporation
incorporated under the laws of any state or territory of the United States
of America or any voluntary religious association, and who fully
conforms to the rites and practices prescribed by the supreme conference,
convocation, convention, assembly, association or synod of the system or
faith with which they are affiliated. Provided, however, that any church
or religious organization which is organized for the primary purpose of
conferring certificates of commission, credit or ordination for a price and
not primarily for the purpose of teaching and practicing a religious
doctrine or belief, shall not be deemed to be a bona fide church or
religious organization.
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3. California Enters the Debate
In Gladstone v. Galton, decided in 1940, several members of the
Psychic Spiritual Science Church appealed the dismissal of a
complaint they had filed against a policewoman (Galton) who had
arrested one of their members for violating the Los Angeles fortune
telling ordinance.1 23 Instead of pursuing the action in state court, they
sought relief in the federal courts under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. ' The appellants alleged that Galton
had acted out of religious prejudice,124 an attempt to counteract the
effect of a content neutral statute on the books since 1932. Further,
they claimed that the exemption under Los Angeles Ordinance section
43.31 granted an unconstitutional exemption to religious
organizations to carry on fortune telling,1 25 so that in fact section
43.30 was not content neutral. It, in fact "discriminate[d] against other
fortune tellers or the like" and "violate[d] the due process provisions
of the Fourteenth Amendment." 2 6 The Ninth Circuit disagreed:
Examination of section 43.30 and 43.31 discloses that no
discrimination can exist. Section 43.30 prohibits anyone
from engaging in the business of fortune telling. Section
43.31 does not purport to permit persons to engage in the
business of fortune telling, but it does provide that the
provisions of section 43.30 shall not be deemed to prevent
worship services of those who conduct such services of a
church organization having as one of its tenets or articles of
faith a belief in an ability to foretell the future, or to
prophecy. When and if the ministers of such a church step
aside from their pastoral duties and engage in the business of
fortune telling, they render themselves subject to the
prohibitory provisions of section 43.30. The legislative
authority, acting within its proper field, is not bound to extend
its regulations to all cases which it might reach. It is free to
confine its restrictions to those classes of cases where the
need is greatest. A law which hits the evil where it is most
felt will not be overthrown because there are other instances
L.A., CAL., PUB. WELFARE ORDINANCES ch. IV, art. 3, § 43.31 (2015)
123. Gladstone v. Galton, 145 F.2d 742, 743 (9th Cir. 1940).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 745.
126. Id. at 743.
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to which it might have been applied. The principle applies
fortiori to such an exemption as in section 43.31.
As the court notes, a generally applicable law does not cease to
be generally applicable because the legislature chooses to provide an
exemption for religious worship. As long as the worshippers can
demonstrate genuine belief and abide by the restrictions imposed by
the legislature (including those against advertising and fortune telling
for a price), they can avail themselves of the exemption. 2 8  But
fortune telling for a price (or fee) is still against the law, as the Ninth
Circuit points out. 129
In 1944, Viola Wedderburn, an official of the California. State
Spiritualist Association, attempted to use a writ of habeas corpus to
obtain the release of Lillian Apgar, a practicing Spiritualist convicted
under the Los Angeles ordinance.' 30  Wedderburn argued that the
court should have acquitted Apgar based on the exemption provided
in section 43.31.131 The appellate court ruled, however, that a writ of
habeas corpus is proper only to examine the verdict "so that the court
may decide whether it violates constitutional guaranties."I32 Thus, the
127. Id. at 745.
128. Id. The legislature has redefined what is normally prohibited (fortune telling)
as not prohibited if it takes place as part of a religious service in which such a
practice is considered required. Id. If the minister steps outside the magic circle of
protection, he leaves himself open to a charge of violating the statute. Id. "When
and if the ministers of such a church step aside from their pastoral duties and engage
in the business of fortune telling, they render themselves subject to the prohibitory
provisions of section 43.30." Id. The legislature is not required to offer an
exemption, but it may.
129. Id.
130. In re Wedderburn ex rel. Apgar, 151 P.2d 889, 889 (Cal. Ct. App. 1944).
Mrs. Lillian Apgar, in whose behalf the instant proceeding in habeas
corpus has been initiated, was charged in a complaint issuing out of the
Municipal Court of the City of Los Angeles, with a misdemeanor, to wit:
violation of section 43.30 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code (Ordinance
No. 77,000), in that on April 12, 1944, she did wilfully and unlawfully
'engage in and carry on the business of telling fortunes by means of
psychic powers, prophecy, clairvoyance and magic . . . .'
Id. The trial judge sitting without a jury found the defendant guilty, and on May 31,
1944, imposed a fine of $150 as punishment for the offense. Id. Defendant refused to
pay such fine, whereupon she was remanded to the Chief of Police of Los Angeles to
be imprisoned in the city jail "in the proportion of one day's imprisonment for
each .. . 3 dollars of the fine not otherwise satisfied ... not exceeding 50 days . . .
Id.
131. Id. at 890.
132. Id.
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court dismissed the writ, determining instead that the defendant
should have appealed from the trial court's verdict.'33
In 1964, Spiritualists thought they saw a glimmer of hope in a
California Supreme Court decision that allowed members of the
Native American Church to continue using peyote in their religious
ceremonies despite a state banl 34 on the unauthorized possession of
narcotics and dangerous drugs.'3 5 In People v. Woody, the Native
American claimant asserted both a First Amendment and a state
constitutional defense.'36  After a careful examination of the role
peyote plays in the celebration of certain Native American religious
beliefs, the court found that "the statutory prohibition most seriously
infringes upon the observance of the religion."' 3 7  Further, "[t]he
record thus establishes that the application of the statutory prohibition
of the use of peyote results in a virtual inhibition of the practice of
defendants' religion. To forbid the use of peyote is to remove the
theological heart of Peyotism."138
Additionally, the court discussed the "compelling state interest"
that the state would need to demonstrate in order to limit the
defendants' First Amendment right to freedom of religion, and found
it lacking:
The People urge that "the use of peyote by Indians in place of
medical care, the threat of indoctrination of small children,"
and the "possible correlation between the use of this drug and
the possible propensity to use some other more harmful drug"
justify the statutory prohibition. The record, however, does
not support the state's chronicle of harmful consequences of
the use of peyote. The evidence indicates that the Indians do
not in fact employ peyote in place of proper medical care;
and, as the Attorney General with fair objectivity admits,
"there was no evidence to suggest that Indians who use
peyote are more liable to become addicted to other narcotics
than non-peyote-using Indians." Nor does the record
substantiate the state's fear of the "indoctrination of small
133. Id. at 891.
134. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11500 (West 1945) (repealed 1972).
135. People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813, 814 (Cal. 1964).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 816.
138. Id. at 818.
139. Id.
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children"; it shows that Indian children never, and Indian
teenagers rarely, use peyote. Finally, as the Attorney General
likewise admits, the opinion of scientists and other experts is
"that peyote . . . works no permanent deleterious injury to the
Indian. . . ." Indeed, as we have noted, these experts regard
the moral standards of members of the Native American
Church as higher than those of Indians outside the church.1 40
The court also rejected the state's other contentions in support of
bans on the use of peyote, pointing out that other states exempted the
use of peyote specifically for religious purposes and seemed to suffer
no particular harm.141 Finally, the court rejected the state's contention
that a "peyote exemption" would require inquiry in each case into the
bona fides of a particular defendant's beliefs, an inquiry which is both
difficult and "repugnant to the spirit of our law . . . ."142
The court distinguished carefully in its opinion between its
decision and the holding in Reynolds v. United States, particularly
since Reynolds disallowed the religious exemption. 143 It noted that,
while polygamy was a "basic tenet" in Mormon theology, it was "not
essential" to Mormon religious practice.'" However, peyote was "the
sole means by which defendants [were] able to experience their
140. Id.
141. Id. at 819.
142. Id. at 820.
143. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1898). The Supreme Court held
that religious belief in the practice of polygamy could not excuse violation of statute
that forbade the practice. Id. at 166-67.
In our opinion, the statute immediately under consideration is within the
legislative power of Congress. It is constitutional and valid as
prescribing a rule of action for all those residing in the Territories, and in
places over which the United States have exclusive control. This being
so, the only question which remains is, whether those who make
polygamy a part of their religion are excepted from the operation of the
statute. If they are, then those who do not make polygamy a part of their
religious belief may be found guilty and punished, while those who do,
must be acquitted and go free. This would be introducing a new element
into criminal law. Laws are made for the government of actions, and
while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they
may with practices.
Id.
144. Woody, 394 P.2d at 820.
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religion . "45 Second, the governmental interests at stake in
Reynolds were far greater than in Woody.1 4 6
In June 1965, police officers checking on Spiritualist Sylvia
Allinger's activities discovered that she regularly took written
questions from her congregation and answered them for a fee,
claiming the answers were by means of "spiritual
communications." 4 7  Consequently, they arrested Allinger and
charged her with violation of Los Angeles City Ordinance section
43.30. 148 In July, Allinger's attorney obtained dismissal of the
charges with the stipulation that she agreed to discontinue her
activities.1 4 9  Instead, Allinger brought an action for an injunction
against the city, claiming that the stipulation amounted to an
unconstitutional interference with her right to practice her religion.'so
She also requested a ruling that both sections 43.30 and 43.31 (the
religious exemption) were unconstitutional, in a repetition of the
claims already decided in the Gladstone case.'5' Allinger also alleged
that Woody provided her with a religious exemption because fortune
telling (divination) was a part of her faith.' 52 She did admit, however,
that her church did not require the charges of fees, and that the
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Allinger v. City of L.A., 77 Cal. Rptr. 257, 258 (Ct. App. 1969).
148. Id. at 259 n.2.
No person shall advertise by sign, circular, handbill or in any newspaper,
periodical or magazine, or other publication or publications, or by any
other means, to tell fortunes, to find or restore lost or stolen property, to
locate oil wells, gold or silver or other ore or metal or natural product; to
restore lost love or friendship or affection, to unite or procure lovers,
husbands, wives, lost relatives or friends, for or without pay, by means of
occult or psychic powers, faculties or forces, clairvoyance, psychology,
psychometry, spirits, mediumship, seership, prophecy, astrology,
palmistry, necromancy, or other craft, science, cards, talismans, charms,
potions, magnetism or magnetized articles or substances, oriental
mysteries or magic of any kind or nature, or numerology, or to engage in
or carry on any business the advertisement of which is prohibited by this
section.
Id. Note the prohibition against "magic of any kind," the prohibition against
advertising, and the phrase "for or without pay."
149. Id.
150. Id. at 260.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 261.
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ordinance's prohibition would not inhibit her religious practice.
Finally, she stated that she had never charged a fee for making a
prophecy.1 54  Another minister from her church corroborated her
testimony.'55 The court interpreted the police admonition to her as a
warning that "the police department will enforce the city ordinances
in respect of fortune telling."' 56  Said the court: "There is no
suggestion in the letter that defendant will be arrested for practicing
her religion within the scope of its tenets as testified to by herself.
We find nothing improper in the action of the police department."'57
D. Advancing a Successful First Amendment Freedom of Speech
Defense
Crafty sciences practitioners who could not take advantage of a
ministerial exemption because they admitted they were not clergy, or
could not come within the protection of an exemption for some other
reason eventually turned to a freedom of speech argument, pleading
either the federal First Amendment or a state equivalent. In Spiritual
Psychic Science Church of Truth v. City of Azusa, the California
Supreme Court examined such constitutional arguments brought
against a city ordinance banning both the practice and the advertising
of crafty sciences practices.' 58  Crafty sciences practitioners also
brought freedom of speech arguments in federal courts beginning in
the mid-1990s, and with equal success.
1. In the State Courts: Spiritual Psychic Science Church of Truth v.
City ofAzusa
Crafty sciences practitioners who did not or could not claim to
be members of the clergy discovered that a freedom of speech claim
was much more powerful than a freedom of religion claim.
Beginning in the 1980s, both state and federal courts began to hear
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 260.
156. Id. at 261.
157. Id.
158. Spiritual Psychic Science Church of Truth, Inc. v. City of Azusa, 703 P.2d
1119, 1121 (Cal. 1985) overruled by Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 261 (Cal.
2002). The issues on which the Kasky opinion disavowed Spiritual Psychic Church
have to do with the definitions and economic motivations of commercial speech. See
Kasky, 45 P.3d at 261.
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such claims. In some cases, legislatures opted to permit fortune
telling and other crafty sciences if the practitioner did not accept a
fee, but criminalized the practice if the practitioner accepted a fee. If
a court accepts the argument that the state's constitution protects
fortune telling or other crafty sciences speech as protected speech, it
might also void a statute that prohibits such a practice. 59 In the 1984
case of Marks v. City of Roseburg, an Oregon appellate court
invalidated a criminal statute that forbade practitioners of the "occult
arts" to charge fees for their services.'6 The court did not evaluate
the quality or "science" of the practitioners' speech, noting that while
the city could act to prevent fraud, it could not suppress protected
speech. 161
159. See State v. Mitchell, 33 S.E.2d 134, 134 (N.C. 1945). The government
attempted to convict the defendant under a very ordinary looking statute that
prohibited practicing palmistry (the telling of futures by reading the lines of the
hand), for a fee. Id. The lower court found the accused not guilty because, ruled the
Supreme Court,
It is apparent that the judgment was based not on the facts found but
upon the court's conclusion that the statute itself was unconstitutional.
The court was competent to make this ruling at any time. The special
verdict therefore was without significance, and the State's appeal was not
authorized by the enabling statute G.S. § 15-179, as now in force.
Id. at 134-35.
160. Marks v. City of Roseburg, 670 P.2d 201, 204 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).
Defendant's occult arts ordinance focuses on the content of speech or
writing. It is not a violation of the ordinance to engage in an 'unsound
and unscientific' practice. One violates the ordinance only by
communicating to another the information derived from the practice of
palmistry for a fee. The ordinance prohibits a person from lecturing for a
fee or selling an article or book on any of the following subjects, if the
analysis or conclusions are based on a method 'generally recognized to
be unsound and unscientific': (1) social, political or economic history
(subsection B. 1); (2) psychology or psychiatry (subsection B. 2); (3)
social, political or economic trends (B. 3); or (4) any other subject
(subsection B.5). The content of the speech and writing restricted by the
ordinance is clearly within the protection of Article I, section 8. The
constitution guarantees persons the right to speak or write on 'any subject
whatever,' regardless of whether they derived their beliefs from a method
that the majority finds 'unsound and unscientific.'
Id.
16 1. Id.
Defendant may exercise its police power to protect its citizens from
fraud. Defendant cannot, however, restrict the right to speak and write on
the basis of the content of the communication that is within the protection
of Article I, section 8. Defendant's occult arts ordinance focuses on and
restrains expression that comes within the protection of Article I, section
75
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In 1985, the California Supreme Court decided a crafty sciences
case on a freedom of speech rather than a freedom of religion basis.1 62
Spiritual Psychic Science Church of Truth v. City of Azusa involved a
municipal ordinance that prohibited both the practice and advertising
of crafty sciences, whether for religious purposes or for
entertainment. The Church claimed a violation of its rights under
the California Constitution.'64 The city responded, claiming that the
ordinance in question was "a valid regulation of a commercial activity
because it prohibit[ed] fortunetelling only for consideration."16  The
city contended that fortune telling as a religious practice (as part of
the tenets of the spiritualist church) was perfectly permissible, citing
In re Bartha. 6 However, as the California Supreme Court pointed
out, the inquiry does not end simply (or merely) because the speech
can be characterized as commercial:
We are unable to subscribe to Bartha 's broad characterization
of fortunetelling as an exclusively commercial activity, and to
the theory that it therefore can be indiscriminately regulated,
or, in this instance, wholly prohibited. (1) The essence of the
issue whether an activity falls within the constitutional
protection of "speech" is whether the "speaker," by engaging
in the activity, is communicating information of any sort ....
Fortunetelling is different. It involves the communication of
8. We are unable to interpret the ordinance in a manner that eliminates
this defect.
Id. However, Craig Freeman and Steven Banning suggest that fortune telling cases
are actually ultimately "right to listen" cases. See Craig Freeman & Steven Banning,
Rogues, Vagabonds, and Lunatics: How the Right to Listen Cleared the Future for
Fortune Tellers, in LAW AND MAGIC: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 31 (Christine A.
Corcos ed., 2010). 1 disagree in part, but they make some excellent points.
162. Spiritual Psychic Science Church, 703 P.2d at 1124.
163. Id. at 1120.
No person shall practice or profess to practice or engage in the business
or art of astrology, augury, card or tea reading, cartomanicy, clairvoyance,
crystalgazing, divination, fortune telling, hypnotism, magic, mediumship,
necromancy, palmistry, phrenology, prophecy, or spiritual reading, or
any similar business or art, who either solicits or receives a gift or fee or
other consideration for such practice, or where admission is charged for
such practice.
Id.
164. "Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or
abridge liberty of speech or press." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(a).
165. Spiritual Psychic Science Church, 703 P.2d at 1121.
166. Id. at 1122.
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a message directly from the fortuneteller to the recipient.
That words are used is not critical; the key is that the words
convey thoughts, opinions and, sometimes, fiction and
falsehoods. This communication between persons, however,
is at the very core of what is known as speech. That
fortunetelling consists of speech does not of itself determine
what level of protection it must be afforded under article I,
section 2, of the Constitution, but it does establish that
fortunetelling is not a "mere commercial activity." The
conclusion in Bartha implies that to characterize an activity
as merely commercial magically removes any constitutional
barriers to its regulation or prohibition. (2) But it is manifest
that speech does not lose its protected character when it is
engaged in for profit . . .. Further, "Characterizing [a]
publication as a business, and the business as a nuisance, does
not permit an invasion of the constitutional immunity against
restraint." "The idea is not sound . . . that the First
Amendment's safeguards are wholly inapplicable to business
or economic activity. And it does not resolve where the line
shall be drawn in a particular case merely to urge ... that an
organization for which the rights of free speech and free
assembly are claimed is one 'engaged in business activities'
or that the individual who leads it in exercising these rights
receives compensation for doing so." It is thus no answer to
the charge that the ordinance violates the Constitution to
characterize what it prohibits as commercial activity; we must
still inquire whether speech is being repressed. And when, as
here, speech is indeed involved, we must evaluate the
constitutionality of the regulation under the stringent tests of
article 1, section 2, of our Constitution.
For the court, "fortune telling is different" substantively from
commercial activity. What then is "different" about it? Particularly
in this case, what is unconstitutional about limiting expressions that
seem to do "no more than propose a commercial transaction,", is
that the message encompasses more than the commercial transaction.
In such circumstances the message itself is the transaction.
In a time honored and traditional line of both English and U.S.
cases, such transactions, as we have already seen, have been either
limited or banned outright. The city also suggested that fortune
167. Id. at 1122-23.
168. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
762 (1976).
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telling "does not concern or affect the political process," and therefore
fell outside the protection of the First Amendment.'6 9 But the court
rejected this argument; Under the First Amendment, said the Court,
many types of speech that cannot specifically be defined as "political"
nevertheless merit First Amendment protection.1 70  The Court was
unwilling to say that fortune telling had no political message:
[I]t is impossible to say that fortunetellers impart no political
message in their communications. In their vision of the future
there may be a view of society as they perceive it may one
day be. Such a communication conceivably could contain the
spark of a political flame. Second, fortunetelling may fire the
imagination and stimulate discussion of the future. That
some - even a majority - may find this mode of
communication distasteful, ridiculous or even corrupt is
irrelevant to constitutional concerns. Thus any prohibition or
regulation of fortunetelling must be given full scrutiny under
the Constitution.171
This inquiry did not necessarily mean that such speech was
wholly immune from regulation, but the court rejected the city's
contention that fortune telling speech was commercial speech and
thus could be banned.1 7 2 The city presented its traditional arguments,
among them that a fortune telling ban falls within the traditional
police power because fortune telling is an inherently deceptive
practice. Citing Gertz v. Robert Welch,'73 the prosecution urged that
although the First Amendment protects false ideas, it recognizes no
value in false statements of fact.174 Fortune telling by its nature,
argued the prosecution, is replete with false statements of fact. 75
Citing Bartha, the city noted that,
169. Spiritual Psychic Science Church, 703 P.2d at 1124.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1124-25. The court cited Lawrence Tribe to the effect that the Supreme
Court has two approaches to resolving First Amendment claims: one protects speech
unless it falls into clearly proscribed categories (the strict scrutiny approach) and the
other regulates according to time, place, and manner. Id. at 1124. The court engaged
in an extensive O'Brien analysis. Id. at 1126. However, since the court had already
indicated that the ordinance was content-based, application of the O'Brien test seems
odd.
172. Id. at 1128.
173. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
174. Spiritual Psychic Science Church, 703 P.2d at 1124.
175. Id. at 1125.
78
[Vol. 37:1
STATE BANS, REGULATIONS, AND "CRAFTY SCIENCES" SPEECH
The ordinance need not necessarily be limited to cases
involving an actual intent to defraud. It is within the police
power of the municipality and province of the legislative
body to determine that the business of fortune-telling is
inherently deceptive and that its regulation or prohibition is
required in order to protect the gullible, superstitious, and
176
unwary.
As in the earlier federal case of Trimble v. City ofNew Iberia,'77
the court viewed the Azusa ordinance not as a content neutral piece of
legislation, but rather as a content-based ordinance forbidding a
specific type of speech.' 78 If the city had wanted to prohibit deceit, as
indeed it did, it should have done so using a particular type of
legislation provided for within its arsenal, such as a licensing statute,
or it should have done so with a much more narrowly tailored
ordinance-for example, with an ordinance forbidding a specific type
of fraud. The city did neither. 79
The court pointed out that the city could have approached a
fortune telling ban by defining it as fraud in another way:
A law prohibiting fraud in fortunetelling could be written;
indeed, it exists. Penal Code section 332 provides that
"Every person who by .. . pretensions to fortunetelling, trick,
or other means whatever. . . fraudulently obtains from
another person money or property of any description, shall be
punished as in case of larceny of property of like value."
Such a law prohibits unprotected fraudulent fortunetelling
while allowing true believers to practice their art. The public
goal is vindicated without unduly suppressing the exercise of
constitutional rights. 80
Alternatively, the city could have labeled fortune telling as
"fraudulent deceit" under California Civil Code section 1710,
defining it as "[t]he suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by
one who does not believe it to be true" or "[t]he assertion, as a fact, of
that which is not true, by one who has no reasonable ground for
believing it to be true."181 As the court pointed out, under Richard P.
176. Id. at 1125-26.
177. Trimble v. City of New Iberia, 73 F. Supp. 2d 659, 667 (W.D. La. 1999).
178. Id. at 666-67.
179. See id at 667.
180. Spiritual Psychic Science Church, 703 P.2d at 1129.
181. Id. at 1126.
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v. Vista Del Mar Child Care Service,182 a defendant charged under
such an ordinance could have mounted an affirmative defense by
stating that his prediction was an opinion, "not actionable unless the
speaker knows the opinion [was] unwarranted or induce[d] reliance
on the opinion as it were an expression of fact."'83
In cases where fortune tellers plead religious exemptions,
fortune tellers who ask for constitutional free speech exemptions
would have the burden of demonstrating they had good faith beliefs in
their ability to predict the future. The free speech exemption is
therefore the secular analogue to the religious exemption lacking in
legislation such as Los Angeles Municipal Ordinance section 43.30
and in other pieces of legislation already examined in this Article.
The court digressed by noting that others also make predictions:
[T]here are many persons other than professional
fortunetellers who purport to predict the future: e.g., astrology
columnists in daily newspapers, economists who
prognosticate interest rates and other business conditions,
investment counselors who forecast stock market trends,
sportswriters and oddsmakers who predict the winners of
athletic contests, horserace handicappers, pollsters who
forecast election returns, and clergymen who describe the
concept of a hereafter. 184
This list is instructive. Economists spend years studying the
theory of markets.'85  One would hope that investment counselors
have at least some expertise in money markets.'8 6  Sportswriters
182. In re Richard P. v. Vista Del Mar Child Care Serv., 165 Cal. Rptr. 370 (Ct.
App. 1980).
183. Spiritual Psychic Science Church, 703 P.2d at 1126. Similarly, under
defamation law, the public official or public figure plaintiff must show that the
defendant made a statement of fact knowing it to be untrue or with reckless disregard
as to its falsity in order to demonstrate liability. See New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964). In most jurisdictions, a private figure plaintiff
must show that the defendant made a statement of fact negligently in order to
demonstrate liability. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 376 (1974).
184. Spiritual Psychic Science Church, 703 P.2d at 1126.
185. The discussion of credentials, particularly with regard to the choice of expert
witnesses, has something of a bibliography in the literature. See, e.g., Walter D.
Johnson & Edward L. Sattler, The Importance of the Selection Process in
Maintaining Expert Credibility: A Guideline For Choosing the Economist, 2 J. LEGAL
EcON. 3, 6-10 (1992).
186. But see the case of Sean David Morton, who claimed to have predicted "all
the highs and lows" of the stock market for fourteen years and advertised himself as
"America's prophet." See Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Nationally Known
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follow the careers of athletes and make their predictions at least to
some extent based on past performance.'87  Bookies have some
economic stake in the outcome of sporting events. Thus they would
have acquired some knowledge to go along with their
prognostications.' 8 8  Their predictions are not simply guesses.
Pollsters base their predictions on extensive data collection.' 9 Of the
court's list, fortune tellers and the clergy also give advice and
counsel, but they do not claim to ground their predictive statements in
the same sorts of evidence as do economists and pollsters. Judges
regularly reject astrologers' claims that astrology is scientific,'" and
the clergy do not generally claim that religion is scientifically
based.' 9 ' The court's point is that the First Amendment protects
expressions of opinion, without regard to whether that opinion is
"true" or "false." 92  Further, the California Constitution provides
protection for both speech and activity that the ordinance at issue in
Spiritual Psychic Church made impermissible.1 9 3
Psychic in Multi-Million Dollar Securities Fraud (Mar. 4, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-34.htm. He attributed his ability to predict
lucrative opportunities for investors to his psychic powers. Id. The Securities and
Exchange Commission's George Canellos attributed his ability to "nothing more than
a scam to attract investors and steal their money . . . ." Id.
187. Whether their predictions are accurate may be open to debate. See Robert L.
Winkler, Probabilistic Prediction: Some Experimental Results, 66 J. AM. STAT.
Ass'N. 675 (1971) (analyzing sportwriter predictions of accuracy rates of football
game outcomes at less than 50 percent).
188. At least one academic denies that that financial forecasting is the same thing
as fortune telling. "Forecasting is not the same as fortune telling; unanticipated
events have a way of making certain that specific forecasts are never completely
correct. This note purports, however, that thoughtful forecasts aid understanding of
the key bets in any forecast and the odds associated with success." See Michael J.
Schill, The Thoughtful Forecaster 1 (Oct. 21, 2008) (unpublished manuscript,
University of Virginia) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=909922.
189. See, e.g., GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/home.aspx?ref-logo (last visited
Mar. 25, 2015).
190. State v. Neitzel, 125 P. 939, 940 (Wash. 1912).
191. One of the few exceptions is the current "Intelligent Design" movement to
base some claims about the origins of life on Earth and the origins of the Universe in
science. See generally Center for Science and Culture, DISCOVERY INST.,
http://www.discovery.org/id/ (last visited May 7, 2015). This movement promotes
teaching the idea of intelligent design in the science curriculum. Id. Intelligent
design was found to be structured along religious, not scientific, principles, in
Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 716 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
192. Spiritual Psychic Sci. Church of Truth, Inc. v. City of Azusa, 703 P.2d 1119,
1125 (Cal. 1985).
193. Id. at 1127.
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2. In the Federal Courts: Rushman Opens the Door
In 1995, a Milwaukee police officer told astrologer Carol
Rushman that her tent at the annual "Bastille Days" celebration in the
city's Cathedral Park violated the city's ordinance against the
advertising of crafty sciences, including astrology and fortune
telling.1 94  The city provided a religious exemption, for which
Rushman could not qualify.'9 5 The officer issued Rushman a citation
for which the sanction was a fine of up to five hundred dollars and or
imprisonment.1 96  The mayor ultimately intervened on Rushman's
behalf, and she reopened her business.' 97 However, she was required
to appear before the city attorney who, after interviewing her,
informed her that she was violating the ordinance and that she would
not be allowed to practice astrology or appear on a local radio
program to present her views.1 9 8 Rushman filed suit under the Civil
Rights Act'" claiming the ordinance violated her First Amendment
The City assures us that the ordinance is aimed only at communications
that purport to predict future events. Assuming that such a ban would be
permissible, however, the ordinance contains no words to this effect.
Thus the prohibition against 'spiritual reading' could encompass Bible
lessons, the bar against 'hypnotism' could include hypnosis as an
accepted technique of the psychotherapist, the banning of 'magic' could
prevent numerous popular theatrical performances, and the prohibition of
'prophecy' could interfere with many religious services. The ordinance
is clearly overbroad, applying to many activities that are protected by the
California Constitution.
Id.
194. Milwaukee City Ordinance section 106-16 provides:
No person shall advertise by sign, circular handbill, or in any
newspaper, periodical or other publication, or by any other means, to
tell fortunes ... with or without pay, by means of occult or psychic
powers, faculties or forces, clairvoyance, psychology, psychometry,
spirits, mediumship, seership, prophecy, astrology, palmistry,
necromancy, or other craft, science, cards, talismans, charms, potions,
magnetism, or magnetized articles or substances, oriental mysteries, or
magic of any kind, or numerology, or engage in or carry on any
business the advertisement of which is prohibited by this section.
Rushman v. City of Milwaukee, 959 F. Supp. 1040, 1046 (E.D. Wis. 1997).
195. Presumably Rushman's profession as an astrologer prevented her from
claiming a religious status. See id. at 1042.
196. Id. at 1043, 1041.
197. Id. at 1043.
198. Id.
199. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
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rights. 200 The district court analyzed the case as a speech-for-profit
case, rather than as a commercial speech case:
An astrological prediction, without more, is not commercial
speech because the speech is the substance of the transaction.
Commercial speech-like an advertisement-is incidental to
an economic transaction; it proposes or encourages a
transaction .... Telling fortunes or giving advice based on
astrology (without more) is speech-for-profit, not commercial
speech. For example, Rushman's predictions, analysis, and
advice are the benefit of the bargain (whatever the worth); an
astrologer's advice neither proposes nor encourages an
additional transaction.20 '
Thus, the court differentiates between Rushman, a "legitimate"
astrologer who engages in one, finite transaction, and a fraudulent or
"bunko" artist whose intent is to entice customers into purchasing
additional services. 20 2
The court further determined that Rushman's speech did not fall
into any categories that the government could legitimately limit or
prohibit under the First Amendment-it was not defamatory, false,
obscene, or inciting, and it did not constitute "fighting words."203
If truth were a test for censoring noncommercial speech, the
government could ban books that proclaim the earth is flat, which is
at least as false as astrology. Nor does Rushman's aiming her
statements at a specific person change the analysis. If a financial
planner believed the earth was flat and advised clients not to invest in
international cruise lines because their ships would fall off the edge of
the earth, the City could not outlaw that advice either. Moreover, the
Ordinance bans more than false speech; therefore, it is not narrowly
tailored to serve the City's justification, even if the justification were
a compelling interest. The government may not use a legitimate
reason for regulation as a foundation to censor speech unrelated to
that reason.204
200. Rushman, 959 F. Supp. at 1041.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1044.
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In addition, even if Rushman's speech were false, unless she
knew of some reason that her speech was also fraudulent, the city
could not ban it:
Even in commercial speech, predictions about future events
are fraudulent only if the speaker knows of facts that will
prevent the prediction from coming true. In other words, the
law rarely judges the validity of a predictive method.
Especially because Rushman's speech is not commercial
speech, her predictions, perhaps no better than random
guesses, are neither false nor true. Although the City can
draft an ordinance that focuses on fraud, this ordinance
censors more than fraud (even more than false statements).
Therefore, the Ordinance's scope exceeds the City's
justification.205
For the first time, in Rushman, a federal court squarely
confronted the notion that crafty sciences speech might be equivalent,
in terms of its right to protection under the First Amendment, to
speech provided by those whom the public generally considers
"knowledgeable" about specialized fields and who make predictions
about the future ("financial planners").206  In making such an
equivalency, the court made no value judgments. concerning the
quality of the speech-it concerned itself only with the right to
protection of crafty sciences speech as opposed to economists,
meteorologists, or financial planners. 20 7
The Rushman court also addressed the "for profit" question. 2 08
Obviously, the problem is not simply the presumption that crafty
sciences speech is deceitful. It is also that the speaker intends to
profit somehow from the speech. Thus, even if a court determines
that the First Amendment protects crafty sciences speech as religious
speech or as speech generally, a legislative body still might object
that allowing the speaker to profit from the speech is impermissible
because profit would encourage fraudulent speech. Yet, the court
pointed out that once a court determines the First Amendment
protects the speech in question, the fact that the speaker also profits
from it does not tarnish the speech.
205. Id. at 1045.
206. See id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
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Following the decision in Rushman, other federal courts have
ruled in favor of fortune tellers, tarot card readers, and other crafty
science practitioners on similar grounds. Federal district courts ruled
in favor of the plaintiffs in Trimble v. City of New Iberia in 1999,209
and Adams v. City of Alexandria in 2012,210 finding that various local
ordinances violated the U.S. Constitution. In Argello v. City of
Lincoln, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled that a
city ordinance banning crafty sciences practices violated the First
211Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
The ordinance is a content-based regulation of speech. As
such, it can be upheld only if it is supported by a compelling
state interest. No such interest appears here. If the citizens of
Lincoln wish to have their fortunes told, or to believe in
palm-reading or phrenology, they are free to do so under our
system of government, and to patronize establishments or
"professionals" who purport to be versed in such arts.
Government is not free to declare certain beliefs - for
example, that someone can see into the future - forbidden.
Citizens are at liberty to believe that the earth is flat, that
magic is real, and that some people are prophets.212
The court declined to find, as the city urged, that the speech here
was commercial speech, or that it simply limited fortune telling for a
fee.213 Nor would it accept the city's argument that the ordinance was
aimed at fraud.214
Nor can the ordinance be upheld as a prohibition against
fraud. It does not require that fortunetellers know that they
are conveying false information, or that they have no power
of seeing into the future. For all we know, certain persons
genuinely believe that they have such powers. In this belief
209. Trimble v. City of New Iberia, 73 F. Supp. 2d 659, 668 (W.D. La. 1999).
210. Adams v. City of Alexandria, 878 F. Supp. 2d 685, 691 (W.D. La. 2012).
211. Argello v. City of Lincoln, 143 F.3d 1152, 1153 (8th Cir. 1998) (affirming a
district court holding). The court cited Rushman, noting "[i]n short, government may
not prohibit a certain kind of speech simply because it disagrees with it." Id. "It
shall be unlawful for any person to exercise, carry on, advertise, or engage in the
business or profession of clairvoyancy, palmistry, phrenology, mind reading,
fortunetelling, or any other business, profession, or art of revealing or pretending to
reveal past or future events in the life of another." LINCOLN, NEB., CODE § 9.40.030
(1997).
212. Id. at 1152-53.
213. Id. at 1153.
214. Id.
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they may be mistaken, but that is not a decision that
government is free to make under our Constitution.215
The Rushman-Argello line of cases lays out the firm
constitutional grounds for protection of freedom of speech for fortune
tellers, tarot card readers, palmists, and those in related professions.
Combined with the prior line of cases protecting religious expression,
these rulings establish comprehensive constitutional protection for
what we have traditionally understood as crafty sciences speech.
III. REGULATING CRAFTY SCIENCES SPEECH
Federal and state courts have ruled bans of crafty sciences
speech unconstitutional, but legislators in many jurisdictions still
believe that crafty sciences speech and practices are problematic and
pose dangers to society. Consequently, they have turned to other
approaches to try to control both speech and activities in these areas.
Approaches include licensing, permitting, and zoning. In many cases,
jurisdictions attempt to treat crafty sciences speech and activities
differently from other persons and businesses in the same categories,
by imposing more onerous permitting requirements on practitioners,
by categorizing such practitioners in the same categories as those
which require criminal background checks, or by failing to intervene
when community animus agitates against legitimate businesses
seeking permits.
A. Evolving Approaches: Licensing and Permitting
Based on the growing number of successful challenges at the
federal district and appellate court levels, a number of jurisdictions
have abandoned the idea of banning crafty science practices in favor
of licensing. 216 If a jurisdiction makes the choice to turn to licensing
in an attempt to limit speech, and a plaintiff challenges the validity of
the licensing scheme, a court will once again examine the proper
standard to apply in such a case. In licensing cases, many courts
215. Id.
216. Elizabeth Dias, In the Crystal Ball: More Regulation for Psychics, TIME
(Sept. 2, 2010), http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2015676,00.html
(discussing a new regulation for fortune tellers in Warren, Michigan, that includes a
$10 background check, fingerprinting, and a $150 annual fee). Other jurisdictions
that reportedly regulate fortune telling include Will County, Illinois (which regulates
it as a business), and Salem, Massachusetts, home of the original American
witchcraft trials. Id.
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make the determination that the speech being regulated is not simply
commercial speech. That is, it does more than propose a commercial
transaction. It also informs, for example, or conveys a message of
interest to the public. Therefore, the court must apply the appropriate
standard, because if the standard is one of content neutrality, the
inquiry will proceed along one path. If the standard is strict scrutiny,
the inquiry will proceed along another. Thus, the question the court
ought to ask is whether the regulation pertains to speech or whether it
pertains to conduct. Further, it ought to concern itself with whether
the regulation, while neutral on its face, is intended to discourage or
prohibit a particular message.
1. General Licensing Statutes
One of the earliest fortune teller licensing cases, in 1904, was
Wolf V. State.217 The defendant argued that the state could not convict
her of a violation of the statute because she made one representation
to a police officer that she could foretell his future. 2 18 The court
agreed.219 It also noted that the statute provided for the licensing of
fortune tellers. 22 0 However, nearly 15 years later, in 1917, a court
convicted a fortune teller named Haas of engaging in the practice
without having obtained a license.22 1 In 1928, Gertrude Davis
unsuccessfully challenged her conviction for practicing fortune telling
without a license.222 The lower court had diverged from the Wolf
court's interpretation of Ohio law, ruling that "represent[ing] himself
to be an astrologer, fortune-teller, clairvoyant or palmister," even to
one individual, without being duly licensed, would violate the
statute.223 Davis pointed out (correctly) to an unsympathetic Ohio
Supreme Court that neither the State of Ohio nor the City of
Cleveland had created a mechanism for licensing fortune tellers. 22 4
Thus, even though the city and state required fortune tellers to obtain
licenses, neither jurisdiction made it possible for them to comply with
the statute. She alleged that this failure constituted a violation of the
217. Wolf v. State, 34 Ohio Cir. Dec. 751 (Cir. Ct. 1904).
218. See id.
219. Id. at 752.
220. Id.
221. Haas v. State, 38 Ohio C.C. 1, 2 (Ct. App. 1917).
222. Davis v. State, 160 N.E. 473, 476 (Ohio 1928).
223. Id. at 474.
224. Id.
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U.S. Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment and the Ohio Bill of
Rights.225 The Court responded that its duty was to give effect as
much as possible to the statute as written; "the words must be
construed as surplusage, and it only remains to determine whether the
Legislature has power to penalize fortune-telling." 22 6
The Court rejected Davis' argument that fortune telling was "a
lawful trade or business" and "not an offense at common law." 227
Indeed, the Court was correct. Fortune telling, like palmistry,
astrology, and the other crafty sciences, had never been regarded as a
legitimate (that is, a legally recognized) profession, although various
governments were sometimes willing to overlook crafty science
activities.228 The Davis court discussed at some length the history of
"rogue and vagabond" statutes and the disposition of cases in the
United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, 22 9 before upholding
the lower court's decision. 230
The Davis case raises several important licensing issues. First, if
a state code prohibits, or fails to provide for licensing, is licensing
prohibited? Second, if the legislative body decides to allow fortune
telling, what mechanism should it provide? Third, what agency
should oversee licensing of fortune telling? Fourth, what standards
should apply to fortune tellers and who should set them? Each of
these questions raises other, linked issues. As we examine other
licensing cases, we will see plaintiffs and defendants ask courts to
address some of these issues.
If a legislature wishes to combat fraud among crafty science
practitioners without banning the practices, given that so many courts
have found that such bans violate the First Amendment, one way to
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. For example, various monarchs had employed astrologers to cast their
horoscopes. Queen Elizabeth I's personal astrologer John Dee famously cast her
horoscope and selected the date for her coronation. See generally BENJAMIN
WOOLLEY, THE QUEEN'S CONJUROR: THE SCIENCE AND MAGIC OF DR. JOHN DEE,
ADVISER TO QUEEN ELIZABETH I, at 53-56 (2002).
229. Davis, 160 N.E. at 474.
230. The Court also found no juror misconduct, and no religious discrimination,
two other issues on appeal. See id. at 476.
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deal with the issue is to license the practitioners rather than to ban the
practices altogether. Prior to court rulings that found crafty sciences
speech protected under the First Amendment, states could refuse to
license fortune tellers, astrologers, and other crafty sciences
practitioners, and they had every right to do so since courts had held
that the crafty sciences were not legitimate professions. 23 I As Marks
v. City of Roseburg shows, however, they cannot refuse to allow such
practitioners to speak.232 Thus, states and other jurisdictions find
themselves in a somewhat difficult position. For example, they could
advise an astrologer that they do not find his practice legitimate for
purposes of teaching astrology-for example, in a school. A state is
not required, as an official act, to license the teaching of astrology and
233
the granting of a certificate in astrology. But it may not forbid the
astrologer from casting a horoscope for a willing customer, from
advertising that he casts horoscopes, that he is willing to teach anyone
interested how to cast horoscopes, or from speaking to anyone
interested about what he considers to be either the art or science of
astrology.234 Hence, an effective method of keeping track of
231. See e.g., Williams v. Jenkins, 83 S.E.2d 614, 616 (Ga. 1954) (holding that an
ordinance prohibiting fortune telling is valid since fortune telling is not a recognized
"legitimate" business).
232. "Defendant may exercise its police power to protect its citizens from fraud.
Defendant cannot, however, restrict the right to speak and write on the basis of the
content of the communication that is within the protection of Article 1, section 8."
Marks v. City of Roseburg, 670 P.2d 201, 204 (Or. Ct. App. 1983).
233. Higher education institutions obtain accreditation through state and regional
accrediting bodies recognized by the U.S. Department of Education. See
Accreditation in the United States, U.S. DEP'T. OF EDUC. (last modified Mar. 23,
2015), http://www2.ed.gov/admins/finaid/accred/accreditationpg2.html. However, a
state might, as a matter of public policy, permit schools and teachers to present
contrasting theories on issues. See, e.g., Louisiana Science Education Act, S. 733,
2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2008). The bill was passed to
allow and assist teachers, principals, and other school administrators to
create and foster an environment within public elementary and secondary
schools that promotes critical thinking skills, logical analysis, and open
and objective discussion of scientific theories being studied including,
but not limited to, evolution, the origins of life, global warming, and
human cloning.
Id. Many scientists have criticized this statute as "pro-creationist" or "anti-
evolution." See BARBARA FORREST, LA COALITION FOR SCIENCE, ANALYSIS OF SB
733, "LA SCIENCE .EDUCATION ACT" (2008),
http://www.lasciencecoalition.org/docs/Forrest-UpdatedAnalysis-SB_733_6.5.08.pd
f.
234. As early as 1914 a court had differentiated the practice of astrology and the
practice of fortune telling. See People ex rel. Preiss v. Adams, 32 N.Y. Crim. Rep.
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astrology practitioners might be to license and then tax them.235
Licensing avoids one problem in that it allows crafty practitioners the
right to pursue their businesses. A series of cases in several states
suggests the parameters of the licensing and taxing power for states
wishing to regulate such unorthodox professions.
In 1950, a fortune teller named Bridewell challenged the
licensing scheme established by the city of Bessemer, Alabama,
which charged $500 per annum for each "fortune teller . . . and
similar occupations" outside the city limits and $1000 for those
within the city. 23 6 Bridewell charged that the ordinance was both a
"revenue measure and . . . also a police measure in that it [was]
designed to discourage fortune telling in said City . . . ."237 Since
Bridewell's place of business was outside the city's limits and he
received no services, he considered that he was entitled to
reimbursement of the taxes he had paid.238 Nevertheless, the court
began with the assumption that the ordinance was prima facie valid
since it was a health and safety ordinance.239 What doomed
Bridewell's case was his attorney's concession that "the City of
Bessemer was authorized to prohibit absolutely the business of
fortune telling .... "240 If the city could prohibit the practice, it could
also limit it. In support of this rule, the appellate court cited the
Alabama Supreme Court's Mitchell decision.24 1
Other legislatures also found licensing to be a much more
effective tool against crafty sciences practitioners. In the 1961
326 (Crim. Ct. 1914) (holding that astrologer who explains that events may happen
behaves differently from fortune teller who states that events will take place).
235. Licensing sidesteps one problem for the state in, that it allows crafty sciences
practitioners the right to pursue their businesses. It does not however, forestall
another challenge-the First Amendment challenge-since a Spiritualist could still
argue that requiring a license to carry on a business is a violation of the Free Exercise
Clause.
236. Bridewell v. City of Bessemer, 46 So. 2d 568, 569 (Ala. Ct. App. 1950).
237. Id.
238. Id. at 569-70.
239. Id. at 570.
240. Id.
241. Id. The defendant in Mitchell claimed that because the legislature does not
have power to allow any municipality to pass laws inconsistent with state law, and
the state had authorized the granting of licenses for fortune telling, no city could
prohibit the practice. Mitchell v. City of Birmingham, 133 So. 13, 14 (Ala. 1931).
However the Alabama Supreme Court held that fortune telling was traditionally a
deceitful profession, and banning it was within the city's police power. Id.
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Arkansas case of White v. Adams, the legislature imposed a privilege
tax, which the appellee dutifully paid.242 The problem came when her
business dropped off as a result of competition from fortune tellers
whose expenses apparently did not include such taxes since they
243
resided in another state. Adams charged that the tax was so high
that it effectively put her out of business. 2  The Arkansas Supreme
Court refused to accept this argument, citing, among others,
Alabama's Mitchell reasoning.245 The Court pointed out that
legislatures "are entitled to believe" that human beings do not have
paranormal powers, including the power to foretell the future. 24 6
Therefore, they may forbid fortune telling, or they may choose to
allow its practice under certain conditions, including licensing and
taxing. 247
The Court further pointed out that the constitutional protections
that Adams attempted to claim are available only to those engaged in
"occupations of common right." 248  Citing McGriff v. State, which
overturned a tax on photographers,24 9 the Court explained that
licensing when the occupation is one of right has constitutional
implications, but when it is a privilege, it "may be extended, limited,
or denied without violating any constitutional right." 2 50
242. White v. Adams, 343 S.W.2d 793, 793 (Ark. 1961).
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 794.
246. Cf People v. Elmer, 67 N.W. 550, 551 (Mich. 1896) (reasoning that a
legislature's right to disbelieve in the paranormal and thus to ban the practice of the
paranormal).
247. Adams, 343 S.W.2d at 793-94.
The fallacy in the appellee's argument lies in its assumption that fortune
telling is a vocation to be pursued as a matter of common right. It is not.
The lawmakers are entitled to believe that no human being has the power
of foretelling future events and that therefore fortune telling may be a
fraudulent means of preying upon the ignorant, the superstitious, and the
gullible. Consequently it has been uniformly held that the state, in the
exercise of its police power, may constitutionally prohibit fortune telling
altogether... . If the legislature can absolutely forbid the practice of
fortune telling, palmistry, and the like, it must logically follow that the
same result may be achieved by the levy of a tax that is made so high as
to prevent anyone from engaging in the business with profit.
Id.
248. Id. at 794.
249. Id.
250. Id.
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The dissent objected vociferously.2 5 ' Citing the fact that fortune
telling was a lawful profession, it pointed out that the appellee,
"Madame Rose," had paid what it considered to be exorbitant taxes
252
for years. If the legislature had intended to prohibit fortune telling,
or any of the crafty sciences, it should have done so outright instead
of taking the far more dubious course of taxing the practitioners. 2 53
Indeed, sniped an indignant dissent, the tax presented more of a
legislative pronouncement against the practice than outright
prohibition, since as a revenue measure the tax required a three-
fourths vote of the legislature, but an outright ban would have
required only a majority vote.254
Once legislatures decide to follow the course of licensing and
collecting taxes from crafty sciences practitioners, they enter into the
problem of facing challenges from practitioners who believe various
legislative classifications discriminate unfairly against them. For
instance, in the 1970 Tennessee case of Canale v. Steveson, a fortune-
teller claimed that the legislative classifications established prohibited
her from practicing her profession because she lived in the populous
area of Shelby County.2 55 She contended that, had she lived in a more
rural area, the statute would have allowed her to ply her trade.256 Part
of her argument hinged on the fact that, as the legislature had written
the statute, Shelby County was the only county whose fortune tellers
would ever be subject to the law. 2 57 According to her reading of the
statute, the law specified that any county where fortune telling might
be banned had to have reached a population of 400,000 persons in the
1950 census, and "any subsequent census." 258  She offered no
explanation for this dual requirement. Because Shelby County was
the only county meeting that minimal population requirement by the
time the 1950 census was completed, no other county could ever do
251. Id. at 795.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 796.
254. Id. at 795.
255. Canale v. Steveson, 458 S.W.2d 797, 798 (Tenn. 1970).
256. Id. at 800.
257. Id.
258. "It shall be unlawful for any person or persons to practice for a consideration
fortune telling . . . and similar pursuits in the counties of this state whose population
exceeds four hundred thousand (400,000) persons according to the federal census of
1950 and any subsequent federal census." Id. at 798 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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so. Therefore, Shelby County fortune tellers were unfavorably treated
in comparison with fortune tellers in other counties. 2 59
The court did not immediately agree with Steveson's argument.
Instead, it considered whether it could rescue the statute by
"interpret[ing] the word 'and' as meaning 'or' thereby emasculating
the dual requirement and rendering the statute valid." 260 Next, it
turned to the question of whether the classification of "Shelby County
fortune tellers" and "non-Shelby County fortune tellers" itself was
arbitrary and capricious. 2 6 1 Here the court agreed with Steveson as to
the "arbitrary and capricious nature" of the legislation, "thereby
rendering it unconstitutional," an alternative argument.262 The court
reasoned that in order to justify creation of separate classes of fortune
tellers (those in Shelby County and those in other counties), the
legislature must have some "possible reason . .. although a poor
one ... ."263
The government maintained that fortune tellers were more likely
to prey upon residents in more populous counties, but the Court
retorted:
It is difficult, if not impossible, to perceive any reasonable
relationship between population and whatever evils might
accompany fortune-telling. But if any such relationship does
exist, it would seem more plausible that the areas ripe for
fertile pickings would consist of the rural counties of the state
where the fortune-tellers could prey upon the supposed
gullibility of the residents, as opposed to the large
259. Id. at 800.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
If a classification is enacted so as to confer upon a class the benefit of
some special right or immunity, there must be some reason why that
particular class should be the recipient of the right or immunity . . . but as
long as any possible reason can be conceived, although a poor one, to
justify the classification it will be upheld. What is the reason for the
classification . . . ? Why did the Legislature confer this immunity from
fortune-tellers upon the residents of the most populous urban county of
the state? This Court cannot discern any reason for such an arbitrary
classification.
Id.
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metropolitan counties where the populace allegedly is more
sophisticated in the ways of the world.26"
In a 1977 South Carolina case, a fortune teller brought a
constitutional attack upon a statute that required a license for
"itinerant fortune-tellers." 26 5  Helen Cruz claimed that allowing
fortune telling in some counties but not in others effectively treated
persons similarly situated dissimilarly, thus denying some persons
equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. 266 "The appellant argues that the General Assembly, in
enacting section 56-1281, has passed a law, which, by its application,
makes illegal fortunetelling in Greenwood County, whereas the
General Assembly has effectively made the same conduct legal in
neighboring Abbeville and Saluda Counties." 267 The Court agreed,
holding that:
The General Assembly cannot pass legislation which operates
unequally upon a class of citizens. The placing of
fortunetellers in a class is not of itself a denial of equal
protection. However, the law, as applied to the appellant,
treats her in a different manner from others in the same class.
It prohibits her from practicing fortunetelling in Greenwood
County by imposing criminal sanctions upon her conduct. It
is unavailing to argue that all fortunetellers in Greenwood
County are treated equally, for the class is constituted of
fortunetellers in South Carolina, not fortunetellers in each of
the separate counties of this State. Such a classification is
repugnant to the guarantee of equal protection of the laws,
because there is no rational basis upon which to establish
such a classification ... 268
Thus, as long as the state permits the practice of fortune telling,
it cannot discriminate among fortune tellers, creating preferred
classes. Nor can it allow a county in the state to require fortune
tellers to establish residency before they can acquire permits to
practice their profession, since the class as a whole is made up of
fortune tellers.
264. Id. at 800-01.
265. Daniel v. Cruz, 231 S.E.2d 293, 293 (S.C. 1977).
266. Id. at 293-94.
267. Id. at 294.
268. Id. The court also found the section unseverable. Id. at 295.
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In a 1969 Florida case, the Seminole County Board of
Commissioners denied a permit to a palmist in an attempt to outlaw
the practice of palmistry because, the plaintiff alleged, they
disapproved of her occupation. 269 The trial court denied her request
for issuance of a license in spite of the denial, and the court of appeals
reversed the decision of the trial court, saying,
[i]t is patent that the local boards of county commissioners
cannot graft local provisions onto the statute nor can they rely
upon their discretion in refusing to issue all permits to
practice palmistry, thereby effectively outlawing the
occupation. The record reveals that the respondents did not
deny the application for any failure of relator to meet the
statutory requirements. Rather it appears they refused to
issue the permit because they disapproved of the
occupation . 270
The Board defended on the grounds that it could refuse to issue
the permit for other reasons, which the court rejected.
"Respondents ... contend that they may within their discretion deny
the application on other considerations. This contention is without
merit." 27'
More and more communities are using the licensing approach to
(1) obtain money 2 72 and (2) avoid lawsuits over the constitutionality
of bans. Eastpointe, Michigan, recently enacted a licensing ordinance
that allows fortune telling subject to certain restrictions: 2 73
(a) "Fortunetelling" shall mean the telling of fortunes, forecasting
of futures, or reading the past, by means of any occult, psychic
269. Johnson v. Alexander, 219 So. 2d 66, 67 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
270. Id. at 67.
271. Id.
272. The goal of raising revenue is not confined to the U.S. On January 1, 2011,
Romania made the practice of witchcraft and astrology official professions (along
with driving instruction, embalming, and valet services, among others), in an attempt
to collect taxes from its practitioners. "Romania has changed its labor laws to
officially recognize witchcraft as a profession, prompting one self-described witch to
threaten retaliation. The move, which went into effect Saturday, is part of the
government's drive to crack down on widespread tax evasion in a country that is in
recession." See Witchcraft Declared Legal Profession In Romania, Fox NEWS (Jan.
1, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/world/20 11/01/01/witchcraft-declared-legal-profe
ssion-romanial.
273. See Eastpointe Puts New Fortune Telling Ordinance Into Effect, CHANNEL 7
ACTION NEws (Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.wxyz.com/dpp/news/region/macombcou
nty/eastpointe-puts-new-fortune-telling-ordinance-into-effect.
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power, faculty, force, clairvoyance, cartomancy, psychometry,
phrenology, spirits, tea leaves, tarot cards, scrying, coins, sticks,
dice, sand, coffee grounds, crystal gazing or other such reading, or
through mediumship, seership, prophecy, augury, astrology,
palmistry, necromancy, mindreading, telepathy or other craft, art,
science, talisman, charm, potion, magnetism, magnetized article or
substance, or by any such similar thing or act. It shall also include
effecting spells, charms, or incantations, or placing, or removing
curses or advising the taking or administering of what are
commonly called love powders or potions in order for example, to
get or recover property, stop bad luck, give good luck, put bad luck
on a person or animal, stop or injure the business or health of a
person or shorten a person's life, obtain success in business,
enterprise, speculation and games of chance, win the affection of a
person, make one person marry or divorce another, induce a
person to make or alter a will, tell where money or other property
is hidden, make a person dispose of property in favor of another,
or other such similar activity. Fortunetelling shall also include
pretending to perform these actions.274
Does licensing help the consumer? Possibly, although
depending on the licensing fees, licensing might simply make fortune
tellers charge higher fees, or induces them to skirt the licensing
requirement all together.2 75
The license fee must also be proportionate. In Consolidated City
of Jacksonville v. Dusenberry, the appellate court upheld the trial
court's decision that the city's $1,000 occupational license tax "for
fortune tellers, clairvoyants, astrologists, etc," which the city
acknowledged was a "revenue raising device," was invalid.276
2. Licensing Inconsistent with a More Permissive General Law
In some cases, a state legislature might not forbid crafty sciences
speech, and might be silent on the issue of licensing, suggesting that a
municipality may allow the licensing of fortune telling, or
alternatively, may ban fortune telling. In other cases, the state law
274. EASTPOINTE, MICH., CODE § 12-332 (2014).
275. Fortune-teller, Tell Thyself, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 28, 1998), http://www.eco
nomist.com/node/166043 (noting that Cecil County, Maryland charges a fee of $250
per year, and some fortune tellers "set up shop" outside county limits to avoid
paying).
276. Consol. City of Jacksonville v. Dusenberry, 362 So. 2d 132, 133 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1978).
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may ban fortune telling, but a state constitutional provision might
suggest (through a religious provision) that fortune telling is
permissible, and/or some other statute might provide for licensing.
Louisiana's Revised Statutes section 4:7 states that parishes may
regulate, restrict, and tax traveling amusements such as circuses and
carnivals, including fortune tellers.277  As a result, some
municipalities have attempted to ban fortune telling and similar
activities. Indeed, one Attorney General opinion issued in 1983
informed St. Mary's Parish officials that prohibiting fortune telling
was consistent with a statute, since repealed, that reads almost
identically with the current law.278 However, the state's constitution
protects both freedom of worship and freedom of speech. 27 9  The
Louisiana Criminal Code does not appear to prohibit crafty sciences
practices.280 Thus, such ordinances have drawn a number of
successful challenges, including the one in St. Mary's Parish.
Yet a number of Louisiana parishes and cities have banned
crafty sciences practices, reading the language of the statute ("may
regulate and restrict") to mean "may prohibit." One could argue that
the word "restrict" includes all types of prohibition, including a
complete ban, and that is certainly how Louisiana parish governments
have read the statute. However, the current statute, which uses the
277. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §4:7 (1992).
278. See Legality of St. Mary Parish Ordinance, 83 Op. Att'y Gen. 41 (1983),
available at 1983 WL 177598. The A.G. opinion was issued consistent with the
statute as it read prior to 1992. Id.
The governing authorities of the several parishes, the City of New
Orleans and all municipalities excepted, may regulate and suppress, and
impose a privilege tax on, all circuses, carnivals, shows, theaters, pool
and billiard tables, bowling alleys, concerts, fortune tellers, cane or knife
racks, gift enterprises, museums, menageries, flying jennies, pistol or
shooting galleries, ten pin alleys (without regard to the number of pins
used), skating rinks, roller coasters, and other things of like character.
Id.
279. The Freedom of Expression Clause in the Louisiana Constitution reads: "No
law shall curtail or restrain the freedom of speech or of the press. Every person may
speak, write, and publish his sentiments on any subject, but is responsible for abuse
of that freedom." LA. CONST. art. I, § 7. The Freedom of Religion clause reads: "No
law shall be enacted respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof." Id. § 8.
280. 1 have searched the Code and have been unable to find a section that prohibits
such practices. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-14:513 (2014).
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word "restrict," dates from 1992.281 Prior to 1992, the statute used the
word "suppress."282
Some Louisiana municipalities have banned fortune telling for a
fee. 283 Others require a permit.284 For example, the city of East Baton
Rouge bans fortune telling altogether. 2 85 The city of New Orleans,
famous for Jackson Square where a number of fortune tellers and
tarot card readers regularly do business, bans fortune telling for a
281. See Act of June 10, 1992, sec. 1, § 7A, La. Acts 244 (codified as amended at
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4:7 (2014)).
282. "Existing law authorizes parish governing authorities to regulate and
suppress . . . . New law retains existing law except to change references to
suppressing such things to restricting them." See Louisiana Legislative Calendar
Reg. Sess. 1992, at 95. "Suppress[ion]" is much more consistent with the idea of
"prohibition" or "banning" than is "restriction." Id.
283. See e.g., ABITA SPRINGS, LA., CODE § 7-502 (2013); AVOYELLES PARISH, LA.,
CODE § 14-7 (2014).
284. CITY OF PLAQUEMINE, LA., CODE § 13-110 (2014).
285. NEW ORLEANS, LA., CODE § 405.
What is known as 'fortune telling,' 'palmistry,' 'reading futures' and the
like within the city is declared a nuisance and is prohibited, and persons
plying these vocations shall, upon conviction, be subject to a fine not
exceeding twenty dollars ($20.00) or imprisoned not exceeding fifteen
(15) days, or both, at the discretion of the judge, who shall have the
authority to require that persons violating the provisions of this section
leave the city.
Id. See also ST. LANDRY PARISH, LA., CODE § 14-39 (2014) (banning fortune telling
and palmistry); ST. MARTIN PARISH, LA., CODE § 26-1 (2015) (banning fortune
telling, palmistry, etc.); ASCENSION PARISH, LA., CODE § 14-1 (2015); TowN OF
KINDER, LA., CODE § 7-278 (2015).
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f286fee. As a result, various fortune tellers and tarot card readers have
challenged such bans, so far with complete success.287
Similarly, several Maryland fortune tellers challenged local
ordinances that prohibited the practice of fortune telling within
Maryland cities. The county code, pursuant to the Maryland
Constitution, permitted fortune telling.289 The court held that the
county's power to permit fortune telling "prevail[ed] over the
prohibitory ordinances of the two municipalities."2 90
More recently, Nick Nefedro, a fortune teller who offers. his
services across the United States, wished to open a location in
Montgomery County, Maryland, and challenged an ordinance that
prohibited fortune telling for a fee in the county. 29 1 The county
argued that fortune telling was illegal (because it was fraudulent), and
286. NEW ORLEANS, LA., CODE § 54-312.
It shall be unlawful for any person to advertise for or engage in, for a
monied consideration, the business of (chronology, phrenology,
astrology, palmistry), telling or pretending to tell fortunes, either with
cards, hands, water, letters or other devices or methods, or to hold out
inducements, either through the press or otherwise, or to set forth his
power to settle lovers' quarrels, to bring together the separated, to locate
buried or hidden treasures, jewels, wills, bonds or other valuables, to
remove evil influences, to give luck, to effect marriages, to heal sickness,
to reveal secrets, to foretell the results of lawsuits, business transactions,
investments of whatsoever nature, wills, deeds and/or mortgages, to
locate lost or absent friends or relatives, to reveal, remove and avoid
domestic troubles or to bring together the bitterest enemies converting
them into staunchest friends. But nothing herein contained shall apply to
any branch of medical science, or to any religious worship.
Id.
287. See Adams v. City of Alexandria, 878 F. Supp. 2d 685, 692 (W.D. La. 2012)
(prohibiting fortune telling in commercial area violated due process clauses of the
federal and Louisiana Constitutions).
288. Mayor of Forest Heights v. Frank, 435 A.2d 425, 427 (Md. 1981).
289. Id.
290. Id. at 437. But see Frank Krasner Enter. v. Montgomery Cnty., 166 F. Supp.
2d 1058, 1061 (D. Md. 2001) (citing the Tillie Frank statute, which the Maryland
legislature enacted to reverse the effect of this ruling); Nefedro v. Montgomery
Cnty., 996 A.2d 850, 868 (Md. 2010) (holding that First Amendment protects fortune
telling speech).
291. Nefedro, 996 A.2d at 852. The court in Nefedro pointed out that "restrictions
on remuneration for speech implicate the First Amendment," based on the Supreme
Court decision in Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N. Y. State Crime Victims
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991), the "Son of Sam" case. Id. at 856-57. The outcome
should have been predictable. See Arin Greenwood, Not In the Cards, A.B.A.J. (June
1, 2010, 8:30 AM), http://www.abajoumal.com/magazine/article/ not in thecards.
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therefore fortune telling for a fee was illegal as well.292 The Court of
Appeals of Maryland did not agree, finding that the ordinance was not
narrowly tailored.293 Indeed, it found that the ordinance
impermissibly burdened speech based on its content.294 While both
sides agreed that fortune telling was speech, they disagreed
concerning the degree to which it was protected speech. 295 The Court
rejected the county's position that the ordinance is constitutional
because it regulates speech that is commercial. 296 The court found
that fortuneteller speech does more than simply propose a commercial
transaction.29 Even though the speaker "may receive money in
exchange for his or her services . . . ,"298 the speaker is also conveying
more than commercial speech. The Court then ruled that because the
ordinance regulated speech according to its content, the government
bore the burden of explaining how the alternative it had chosen was
the most narrowly tailored to achieve its goal. 299 Because it could not
do so, the court ruled the ordinance unconstitutional.m
According to the County, the purpose of the Fortunetelling
Statute is to combat the fraud that apparently ensues from
fortunetelling. There is at least one less restrictive, effective
means for combating fraud: laws making fraud illegal without
respect to protected speech. In fact, Montgomery County
already has such an ordinance. The State of Marland also
has fraud laws that do not restrict protected speech.
Like the Spiritual Psychic Science Church court and previous
courts, the Nefedro court does not accept the proposition that fortune
telling speech is inherently fraudulent:
We are not, however, persuaded that all fortunetelling is
fraudulent. While we recognize that some fortunetellers may
make fraudulent statements, just as some lawyers or
journalists may, we see nothing in the record to suggest that
fortunetelling always involves fraudulent statements. Indeed,
292. Nefedro, 996 A.2d at 854.
293. Id. at 862.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 860.
296. Id. at 861.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 861.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 864.
301. Id. at 863.
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fortunetellers, like magicians or horoscope writers, are able to
provide entertainment to their customers or some other
benefit that does not deceive those who receive their speech.
Just as many other courts have concluded, we view this non-
fraudulent speech as receiving protection under the First
Amendment. 302
In some cases, current licensing laws are extremely strict,
apparently in order to discourage the practice of fortune telling. The
city of San Francisco began licensing fortune tellers in 2003, and
requires, among other things, fingerprinting and a criminal
background check conducted by the police. 30 3 A fortune teller who
has convictions for "fraud, theft, burglary, use of violence, deceit, or
false impersonation" within seven years of the date of his or her
application is unlikely to receive a permit.30 Similarly, now that the
state of Michigan no longer bans fortune telling, the city of Warren,
Michigan licenses the practice. 305  As in San Francisco, the police
department in Warren carries out a criminal background check and no
fortune teller who has a felony or two misdemeanors within seven
years of the request may obtain a license. 306 The city also requires
that:
The record of receipts, payment records, the business
premises, and all articles of property from customers that is
received or maintained on the premises shall be open to
inspection at all times during open business hours by a police
officer or code official. As a condition of doing business, a
licensee is deemed to have given consent to the inspection
prescribed by this section. 3o7
This section seems to be addressed to concerns that fortune
tellers may be involved in theft and deception, those activities
traditionally associated with the business. "'We are not saying these
302. Id. at 858.
303. S.F., CAL., POLICE CODE art. 17.1, § 1301.
304. Id. § 1305 (b)(1-2). Some fortunetellers have a problem establishing their
identity in order to obtain permits. See Albert Samaha, Unpredictable: A
Fortuneteller Encounters S.F. Bureaucracy, S. F. WEEKLY (Mar. 13, 2013), http://w
ww.sfweekly.com/sanfrancisco/unpredictable-a-fortune-teller-encounters-sf-bureaucr
acy/Content?oid=2188250. Because many fortunetellers are members of the Roma
community, a group that traditionally avoids governmental institutions, they tend not
to have birth certificates or other forms of identification. Id.
305. WARREN, MICH., CODE art. XI, § 6-330 (2015).
306. Id. § 6-332 (b)(1).
307. Id. § 6-334.
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people with a license can accurately predict your future,' said Warren
city council secretary Keith Sadowski." 308 "But we wanted to make
sure we had some recourse in case we do get somebody who is not
legitimate."
Strict licensing and permitting requirements put in place to
protect the public from deceptive fortune tellers reflect the historic
concern that those involved in the occult arts are more likely to
deceive their clients than those involved in other businesses. The San
Francisco code section providing for the licensing of fortune tellers
appears in the Police Code, which also includes the regulation of
games of chance,31 o the prohibition of fraud and deceit generally,
regulation of adult theaters and bookstores, 312 prohibiting of
professional strikebreakers,313  and regulation of nude models in
photography studios.314 Other sections of the Police Code also may
require the intervention of the police to protect public health and
safety (for example, restaurants and bars open after hours that may
need security).1  The section includes a ministerial exception.
California also has a specific statute addressing the prohibition
or regulation of the practice of astrology, which offers guidance to
those municipalities that wish to allow the licensing of the practice. 3 17
308. US faces growing problems in regulating fortune tellers, BBC NEWS (Sept.
28, 2010), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-1 1409477.
309. Id.
310. S.F., CAL., POLICE CODE art. 3 (2014).
311. Id. art. 6.
312. Id. art. 11.2.
313. Id. art. 9.5.
314. Id. art. 15.5.
315. Id. art. 15.2.
316. Id. art. 17.1, § 1303.
317. CAL. Gov. CODE §50027 (West 2014); see also CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §
16000 (West 2014).
The legislative body of an incorporated city may, in the exercise of its
police power, and for the purpose of regulation, as herein provided, and
not otherwise, license any kind of business not prohibited by law
transacted and carried on within the limits of its jurisdiction, including all
shows, exhibitions and lawful games, and may fix the rates of the license
fee and provide for its collection by suit or otherwise. Any legislative
body, including the legislative body of a charter city, that fixes the rate of
license fees pursuant to this subdivision upon a business operating both
within and outside the legislative body's taxing jurisdiction, shall levy
the license fee so that the measure of the fee fairly reflects that proportion
of the activity actually carried on within the taxing jurisdiction. . . . No
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Some jurisdictions make obvious differentiations between
fortune telling businesses and other businesses. Chesterfield County,
Virginia, charges applicants for fortune telling business permits $300
for business licenses. 318  The county charges applicants for adult
business operating licenses $100 for such licenses.3 19
B. Residency Requirements
Some jurisdictions have tried other methods of limiting the
activities of crafty sciences practitioners. Massachusetts General Law
140 section 1851 provided that no fortune teller could obtain a license
to practice unless he or she had lived in the jurisdiction for at least
one year.320 A well known local fortune teller, Ruth Talamo,
challenged the statute under the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, alleging that the requirement "place[d] an unreasonable
burden on her pursuit of her chosen profession ... and that the
license fee levied ... that is measured by the licensee's income or gross
receipts, whether levied by a charter or general law city, shall apply to
any nonprofit organization .that is exempted from taxes by Chapter 4
(commencing with Section 23701) of Part II of Division 2 of the
Revenue and Taxation Code or Subchapter F (commencing with Section
501) of Chapter 1 of Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or
the successor of either, or to any minister, clergyman, Christian Science
practitioner, rabbi, or priest of any religious organization that has been
granted an exemption from federal income tax by the United States
Commissioner of Internal Revenue as an organization described in
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code or a successor to that
section.
Id.
318. CHESTERFIELD CNTY, VA., CODE CH. 6, art. III, § 6-44 (2014).
319. Id. § 641.1.
320. MAsS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140 § 1851 (2014).
No person shall tell fortunes for money unless a license therefor has been
issued by the local licensing authority. Said license shall be granted only
to applicants who have resided continuously in the city or town in which
the license is sought for at least twelve months immediately preceding
the date of the application. No such license shall be transferred or
assigned. Unless otherwise established in a town by town meeting action
and in a city by city council action, and in a town with no town meeting
by town council action, by adoption of appropriate by-laws and
ordinances to set such fees, the fee for each license granted under this
section shall be two dollars, but in no event shall any such fee be greater
than fifty dollars. Whoever tells fortunes for money unless licensed
under this section shall be punished by a fine of not more than one
hundred dollars.
Id. This law is still in effect. See id.
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requirement burden[ed] her right to free speech as protected under the
First Amendment." 321 While the court seemed sympathetic to her
constitutional arguments, it limited its discussion to a review of the
classifications created by the twelve-month residency requirement. 3 22
Using the rational basis test, it could find no legitimate administrative
purpose for the state to impose a durational residency requirement
before issuing a license. 3 23  Because the court found no legitimate
purpose for the restriction and no reasonable relationship between the
requirement and any legitimate state purpose, the judge ruled that the
provision would fall under "the traditional standard of review." 324
Returning to a strict scrutiny standard, he ruled that the requirement
impermissibly burdened a constitutional right, the right to travel. 3 25
Talamo obtained a preliminary injunction.326
In 1994, plaintiff tarot card readers obtained a preliminary
injunction from a federal district court barring the city of New
Orleans from enforcing a permitting ordinance that restricted the
number of readers allowed in Jackson Square to those who already
held a permit, on the grounds that the readers were likely to prevail on
the merits of the case.3 27 As the court explained, the City's permitting
procedure guaranteed that only those who already held permits could
apply for permits that would allow them to ply their trade in Jackson
Square,328 thus effectively limiting the number of applicants and
ensuring that the number would steadily diminish.329
321. Talamo v. Provincetown Bd. of Selectmen, No. 83-1195-MA, 1983 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17058, at *5 (D. Mass. May 10, 1983).
322. Id. at *9.
323. Id. at*15-17.
324. Id. at *17.
325. Id. at *10- 11.
326. Id. at *19-20.
327. Howell v. City of New Orleans, 844 F. Supp. 292, 293 (E.D. La. 1994).
However, the ordinance does not simply prevent all persons who 'sell
their services from a fixed location for a fixed price in a one on one
transaction' from obtaining a permit in Jackson Square unless they have
had such a permit for two years. While the Ordinance refers to artists in
an effort to prevent readers from circumventing the reader regulations by
obtaining an artist's permit, the ordinance does not regulate artists who
sell their services from a fixed location for a fixed price in a one on one
transaction.
Id.
328. Jackson Square is the popular tourist shopping and sight-seeing area of the
city. Numerous fortune tellers, astrologers, and palmists regularly set up their tables
in Jackson Square, including in front of St. Louis Cathedral, and on the streets
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C. Zoning
Cities and counties sometimes attempt to restrict crafty sciences
practitioners by using zoning ordinances. If the legislative body
draws its measures neutrally and the enforcement arm (the agency, for
example) applies them without abusing its discretion, then its denial
of a zoning permit is likely to withstand scrutiny. Courts regard the
crucial question in such cases as whether local officials treat a
particular applicant's request for a permit differently because of
"illegitimate 'political' or, at least, personal motives."330 If local
officials engage in such action, the courts regard it as "'purposeful
discrimination' against a particular individual [which] violate[s] the
Constitution . . . ."3 An illegitimate political motive includes any
unsubstantiated public fear or negative attitude, if the fear or attitude
is not based on legitimate objections.332 As the court notes, religious
objections by themselves are not generally
[t]he dispositive question is whether "local officials
ha[ve] ... singl[ed] out a permit applicant for adverse
treatment due to 'illegitimate "political" or, at least, personal
motives.' Such 'purposeful discrimination' against a
particular individual . . . violate[s] the Constitution even
where no recognized class-based or invidious discrimination
was involved." Id. at 1420 (quoting Cordeco Development
Corp. v. Vasquez, 539 F.2d 256, 260 (1st Cir. 1976))
(emphasis supplied). As a general matter, therefore, the
public's "negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by
factors which are properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding,
are not permissible bases" for local officials' land use
decisions .... "
The City Council of Chesapeake, Virginia, denied a palmist's
request for a permit based on neighborhood objections,3 which were
nearby. See Carol Forsloff, Fortune Telling Good Business In French Quarter New
Orleans, DIGITAL JOURNAL (Apr. 13, 2009), http://www.digitaIjournal.com/article/
270896. In addition, several local shops offer such services. See Jyl Benson,
Divining the Future, Channeling the Past, NEw ORLEANS FRENCHQUARTER.COM
http://www.frenchquarter.com/shopping/OccultFun.php (last visited May 7, 2015).
329. Howell, 844 F. Supp. at 294.
330. Marks v. City of Chesapeake, 883 F.2d 308, 311 (4th Cir. 1989).
33 1. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id. (footnotes omitted) (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473
U.S. 432, 448 (1985)).
334. Id.
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primarily religious.3 3 s Palmist Steven Marks appealed the denial of a
permit for his business, alleging that the city's refusal to grant him the
requested permit was "arbitrary and capricious."33 6 The district court
reversed the denial, finding the city council had acted arbitrarily and
capriciously, so that, even though the plaintiff had lost interest in
opening his business in the neighborhood, he had still suffered a
constitutional deprivation.33 7 The court ordered the plaintiff to submit
an accounting of damages.3 The appellate court affirmed, noting
first that Marks presented evidence that the city's ordinance
recognized the possibility that palmistry businesses might be sited
within city limits, 33 9 and that the city's planning commission "had
specifically found that Marks' palmistry business would 'pose no
adverse impact on the community.'"34 Further, the appellate court
found that the district court acted within its discretion in deciding
whether religious animus against the plaintiff, originating in the
community, pushed the city council to deny the application.34 1 The
city council argued that economics, not religious animus, was the
motivating factor, but the lower court was not convinced, and the
appellate court stated, "[o]n this record, however, we simply cannot
say that the district court 'clearly erred' by refusing to accept this post
hoc explanation for the ultimate decision on Marks' application-or
by finding instead that the city council's members indeed reacted
'arbitrarily' to irrational pressure from local citizens.342
The appellate court could not have reached its conclusion so
easily if the groundwork had not been laid in earlier cases such as
335. Id.
336. Marks v. City Council of Chesapeake, 723 F. Supp. 1155, 1160 (E.D. Va.
1988). In a 1983 zoning case, the Ninth Circuit noted that
[n]ormally, the denial of a permit will be upheld unless arbitrary. The
scope of federal court review of zoning decisions generally is extremely
narrow. But . . . constitutional concerns are heightened [where] the
individual permit application decision may rest upon inaccurate and
stereotypic fears . . . . In this situation, a court must look more carefully
to determine whether the decision to deny a permit is related to [a]
substantial state interest . ...
J.W. v. City of Tacoma, 720 F.2d 1126, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 1983). (citations omitted).
337. Marks, 723 F. Supp. at I164.
338. Id.
339. Marks, 883 F.2d at 310.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 312.
342. Id.
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Mirsberger and Ballard, holding that investigation into the content of
religious beliefs is the proper province neither of the judicial nor of
the legislative branch. Further, while municipalities generally
maintain business licensing within their purview, they must treat
those they license similarly.343 Courts have repeatedly found that a
city's refusal to license a particular business because members of a
city council or members of the community have religious, ideological,
or moral objections to the pursuit of its otherwise legal activities is an
impermissible use of municipal power.3 "
Another (possibly unstated) reason for the city's denial of
Marks's request for a permit may have been his ethnicity. The name
"Marks" has long been associated with the Roma, and the Roma have
been associated with fortune telling, and thus, in the minds of many
law enforcement personnel and prosecutors, with deception and
fraud.
In 2011, Patricia Moore-King, who practices spiritual counseling
as "Psychic Sophie," brought an action in federal court to challenge
Chesterfield County, Virginia's zoning, business license, and fortune
telling permitting schemes, alleging that they violated her First
Amendment rights and her rights under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).3 46 The district court denied
all of her claims, finding her speech "inherently deceptive," and thus
not protected by the First Amendment, in contrast with other federal
court rulings. "One type of reasonable regulation is that the
government can absolutely prohibit speech that is inherently
343. See ANTIEAU ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 27.04 (Sandra M. Stevenson
ed., 2d ed. 2015).
344. Both Marks and his wife had Virginia state licenses to practice palmistry.
Marks v. City Council of Chesapeake, 723 F. Supp. 1155, 1156 (E.D. Va. 1988). He
had obtained the requisite zoning and conditional use permits. Id. at 1157-58. Those
who opposed the issuance of the palmistry license did so overwhelmingly on
religious grounds. Id. at 1158. To allow the City Council to deny Marks his permit
on the basis of religious objections was impermissible, as the court noted. Id. at
1164.
345. See, e.g., Paula MacMahon, Psychic Accused in $25 Million Fraud Says She
Is Portrayed 'as Some Kind of Monster,' SUN SENTINEL (Dec. 29, 2012),
http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2012-12-29/news/fl-rose-marks-fortune-teller-201212
29_1 rose-marks-fortune-tellers-million-fraud. For a law review note discussing the
"Psychic Sophie" case, see Nicole Brown Jones, Comment, Did Fortune Tellers See
This Coming: Spiritual Counseling, Professional Speech, and the First Amendment,
83 Miss L.J. 639 (2014).
346. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000cc-2000cc-5 (2014).
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deceptive. The weight of authority holds that fortune telling is
inherently deceptive." 347 If the government may prohibit deceptive
speech it may also regulate it.3 4 8 Finally, the court ruled that even if
Moore-King's speech were not "inherently deceptive," it is "a form of
commercial speech . . . verbiage is the product the plaintiff sells." 34 9
The court applied the Central Hudson test to determine whether the
county's ordinance passed constitutional muster and found that it
does. 350  The Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court, but noted
carefully that the record did not support the judge's finding that her
business was "deceptive." 35 ' "A jury might well decide that Moore-
King's activities are fraudulent or deceptive. But at a minimum this
question raises a genuine issue of material fact, making it unsuitable
for decision on a summary judgment basis."352 Similarly, the
appellate court rejected the district court's conclusion that Moore-
King's speech was purely commercial. 3 3 It identified Moore-King's
speech as "professional speech," and as professional speech it fit
comfortably within the county's established licensing scheme. 355 The
appellate court also considered Moore-King's religious claim with
some care, noting that if she held her beliefs sincerely, they need not
be "acceptable, logical, .consistent, or comprehensible to others in
order to merit First Amendment protection . . . ."356 Having examined
them, it found that her beliefs were a sincerely held way of life, but
lacked the organizing principles that characterized a religion. 357
Finally, because Moore-King's beliefs did not constitute a religion,
she could not prevail on her Equal Protection challenge. 358
347. Moore-King v. Cnty. of Chesterfield, 819 F. Supp 2d 604, 618 (E.D. Va.
2011).
348. Id. at 618-19.
349. Id. at 619.
350. Id. at 619-21.
351. Moore-King v. Cnty. of Chesterfield, 708 F.3d 560, 567 (4th Cir. 2013).
352. Id.
353. Id. at 568-69.
354. Id. at 569-70.
355. Id. at 570.
356. Id. For an argument that Moore-King's beliefs represent and appeal to a
discernable slice of the population, see Mark L. Movsesian, Defining Religion in
American Law: Psychic Sophie and the Rise of the Nones (European University
Institute, Working Paper No. RSCAS 2014/19), available at http://www.eui.eu/Proje
cts/ReligioWest/Documents/events/workingpaper/RSCAS2014MovsesianIll.pdf.
357. Moore-King, 708 F.3d at 571-72.
358. Id. at 572.
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IV. STATE AND LOCAL BANS TODAY
In spite of the federal and state court cases that have found
statutes and ordinances banning crafty sciences practices
unconstitutional, legislatures and local governments still attempt on
occasion to pass such measures. Thus, practitioners and their
supporters still find that they must bring lawsuits, or the threat of
lawsuits, in order to overturn such legislation. In addition, older
measures may still be on the books until someone challenges them
because of fear of prosecution, as in the case of St. Johnsbury,
Vermont, psychotherapist Jean O'Neal. O'Neal feared prosecution
under a local anti-fortune telling ordinance because she practices feng
shui.359
A. State Bans
In some cases, local authorities seek to enforce existing bans in
order to demonstrate that they are pro "law and order." The result is a
flurry of criminal prosecutions or civil litigation, and (usually)
embarrassing losses for government, for several reasons.
Often, the statute or regulation at issue looks a great deal like the
ones we have already examined in this Article, and is thus
constitutionally susceptible to attack, or, while it is a regulation that
might look facially neutral, its authors betray animus toward fortune
tellers, tarot card readers, and others whom they consider irreligious
and undeserving of protection.
On April 24, 2007, Philadelphia city prosecutors ordered police
to sweep through the downtown area and close "local storefront
psychics, astrologers, phrenologists and tarot-card readers who charge
money for their services"a in an attempt to enforce a Pennsylvania
law making such practices a misdemeanor. It forbids "for gain or
lucre, to tell fortunes or predict future events, by cards, tokens, the
359. Lisa Rathke, Fortune Telling in Vermont Town Now Has Future, SFGATE
(Sept. 7, 2008, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Fortune-telling-in-
Vermont-town-now-has-future-3270073.php. The town repealed the ordinance.
360. David O'Reilly & Michael Vitez, Who Knew? An Old Law Shuts Psychics
Alerted to a Forgotten State Ban, Phila. Authorities Have Closed at Least 16
Storefront Fortune-Tellers. One Alleged Discrimination, PHILLY.COM (Apr. 27,
2007), http://articles.philly.com/2007-04-27/news/25242350_I_fortune-telling-psych
ics-tarot-card.
361. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7104 (2014).
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inspection of the head or hands of any person. . . ."362 Practitioners
targeted under the statute had purchased business licenses from the
city, and apparently both they and the city believed they were
complying with the law.363 Police made no arrests and the city issued
no fines, according to one city official, as long as those individuals
shut down did not attempt to resume their practices. ' 4  Suburban
police departments apparently did not enforce the law, suggesting
that perhaps the city wanted to clean up the streets out of concern
over possible tourist complaints.3 6 The crackdown occasioned the
usual jokes about fortune tellers' failures to see the police raid
367
coming.
B. Local Bans
In the 2004 case of Daly v. Dickson, a tarot card reader, with the
American Civil Liberties Union's (ACLU) assistance, 6 filed a
challenge against the city's ordinance prohibiting "any person to
conduct the business of, solicit for, or ply the trade of fortune teller,
clairvoyant, hypnotist, spiritualist, palmist, phrenologist, or other
mystic endowed with supernatural powers." 6 The city amended its
ordinance shortly thereafter and the ACLU amended its complaint.370
In 2010, the Tennessee ACLU was back in court, with the case
of tarot card reader and self-described spiritual counselor Candace
Wohlfeil, who challenged an East Ridge, Tennessee, ordinance
banning fortune telling.371 Wohlfeil told city officials in 2008 she
thought the ordinance was unconstitutional and asked for a response,
but received none.372 In 2010, officials told her she was in violation
362. Id.
363. O'Reilly & Vietz, supra note 360.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Agreeing with ACLU Arguments, Tennessee Court Overturns Local Ban on
Fortune Telling, ACLU (June 7, 2004), http://www.aclu.org/free-speech/agreeing-
aclu-arguments-tennessee-court-overturns-local-ban-fortune-telling.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Press Release, ACLU, Fortune Telling Ban Challenged in Federal Court (Oct.
8, 2010), http://www.aclu-tn.org/release 10081 0.htm; see also Livingston Parish Anti-
Divination Ordinance Report Pt I, YouTUBE (Dec. 18, 2008), http://www.youtube.c
om/watch?v-OKvrSlKKAug.
372. Press Release, supra note 371.
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and faced a $500 fine for each infraction; at that point she ceased
giving tarot card readings and filed suit.373 On October 8, 2010, U.S.
District Judge Curtis Collier issued a temporary restraining order
against the city, prohibiting enforcement of ordinance section 11-201,
"Fortune telling, etc." 374
In May 2007, Livingston Parish, Louisiana, passed an anti-crafty
sciences ordinance, perhaps in fear that new arrivals from New
Orleans would flood the area with fortune tellers, palmists,
clairvoyants, and other practitioners. Although the city attorney
warned the city council that the ordinance was undoubtedly
unconstitutional, council members persevered, and within months, a
local store owner filed suit.375 In Gryphon 's Nest Gifts v. Parish of
Livingston, U.S. District Court Judge James Brady granted the
plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment and denied the
defendants' motion for summary judgment. 376  First, Judge Brady
held that the ordinance violated the plaintiffs right to free speech:377
The bedrock principle of the First Amendment is that the
government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.
Trimble, 73 F. Supp. 2d at 667 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 414 (1989)). Prohibition of content-based speech is
subject to strict scrutiny. Trimble, 73 F. Supp. 2d at 667.
Under strict scrutiny, the government must show that the
ordinance is reasonably necessary to achieve a compelling
interest. Id. In this case, Defendant has failed to respond to
this argument. As such, Defendant has failed to show that the
ordinance is reasonably necessary to achieve a compelling
373. Id.
374. See Temporary Restraining Order at 1, Wohlfeil v. City of East Ridge, No.
1:10-CV-275 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 8, 2010), available at http://www.aclu-tn.org/pdfs/
WohlfeilTempOrder.pdf.
375. In March of 2008, Honeycutt told parish council members, "[i]t's clear we are
going to lose the case, I've never seen a problem with this issue, but we've made it an
issue. If you want to fight something I don't think you can win, hire an expert and
spend the money. But I still think you will lose." Alissa Vilardo, Livingston Council
Lets Soothsaying Ban Stand, THE DAILY STAR (Mar. 15, 2008, 12:00 AM),
http://www.hammondstar.com/local-news/news/article_28dl9c89-95e6-5bf6-9a59-
eb8af3efe840.html.
376. Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment at 9, Gryphon's Nest Gifts, Inc. v.
Parish of Livingston, No. 08-001-JJB (M.D. La. Oct. 7, 2008), available at
http://documents.scribd.com/docs/2fr0pr3ols8m0xlio6p8.pdf.
377. Id. at 7.
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interest. Plaintiff uses the Trimble case to support their
argument. This Court agrees with Plaintiff.378
Second, he held that since the ordinance used the phrase "and the
like," it did not give notice of the activities it prohibited and was thus
unconstitutionally vague. 3 79 Not unnaturally, Judge Brady found the
Trimble380 case persuasive. Subsequently, the Livingston Parish
council repealed the ordinance, on the advice of City Attorney Blayne
Honeycutt, the attorney who had originally warned against passage of
the ordinance. 381
Meridian, Mississippi, stood fast against demands that it repeal
its fortune telling ban during the early part of 2011.382 The city
council finally repealed the ordinance when it received a notice of
likely legal action from the American Civil Liberties Union.383
Neighboring Hattiesburg, Mississippi, faced a federal lawsuit over a
similar ordinance from Tommy and Marie Costello, who alleged they
shut down their fortune telling business after city officials told them
fortune telling was against the law. 38  The Costellos charged that the
city's action was a prior restraint.8 In 2012, the city settled the
CRC386case.38
Other challenges to fortune telling bans have come to equally
dramatic resolutions. Courtney Bibb, a Centerville, Georgia, fortune
teller, filed a lawsuit in April, 2010, after receiving an ominous letter
378. Id.
379. Id. at 8.
380. Trimble v. City of New Iberia, 73 F. Supp. 2d 659 (W.D. La. 1999).
381. Bob Anderson, Livingston Parish Council Repeals Soothsaying Prohibition
Ordinance, BATON ROUGE ADVOCATE (Nov. 28, 2008), http://www.2theadvocate.co
m/news/35044669.html.
382. Jennifer Jacob Brown, Council Upholds Fortune Telling Ban, THE MERIDIAN
STAR (Apr. 6, 2011 6:30 AM), http://meridianstar.com/local/x300773669/Council-
upholds-fortune-telling-ban.
383. Associated Press, Foreseeing Lawsuit, City Lifts Fortune Telling Ban, THE
JOURNAL RECORD (Aug. 17, 2011), http://joumalrecord.com/2011/08/17/foreseeing-
lawsuit-city-lifts-fortune-telling-ban-law/.
384. Associated Press, Lawsuit Targets Fortune Telling Ban, WTOK (Aug. 22,
2011, 10:46 AM), http://www.wtok.com/news/headlines/Lawsuit_targets fortune-
tellingban_128184213.html (discussing the suit of Tommy and Marie Costello
against the city).
385. Id.
386. Jesse Bass, Fortune Business Lawsuit Settled, HATTIESBURG AMERICAN (Aug.
3, 2012), http://www.hattiesburgamerican.com/article/20120804/N EWS0 1/2080403
19/Fortune-business-lawsuit-settled.
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from the city.387 In the letter, officials noted that Bibb had described
her business, opened in January of that year as "a wellness
center/bookstore" and suggested that she should have disclosed the
nature of the events she planned to hold there as well as the kind of
beliefs she held in order to "clear[] up" any "lack of awareness or
misunderstanding of the applicable city ordinance . . . ."m The media
quoted Bibb's response: "'How can someone tell me that I can't
practice spiritualism? That's wrong!' said Bibb. She says the city is
trying to prevent her from practicing her religious belief." 38 9 Note
that Bibb claimed a belief in Spiritualism, which set her apart from
many fortune tellers and current day crafty sciences practitioners.
Just days before a hearing, the city repealed the ordinance.39
387. Letter from Krista A. Bedingfield, City Clerk, City of Centerville, to
Courtney Bibb, Owner, Energy Among Us (Apr. 12, 2010), available at
http://www.13wmaz.com/news/PDF/fortunetelling cease I.pdf.
388. Id. The applicable ordinance banned the practice of advertising fortune
telling for a fee -and in good measure the belief, practice or advertising of
spiritualism. It read:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person to have the occupation, or
advertise the practice, of fortunetelling, phrenology, astrology,
clairvoyance, palmistry, spiritualism or other kindred practices,
businesses or professions where a charge is made or a donation is
accepted for the services. (b) Any and all persons guilty of violating any
portion of this section shall be guilty of violating a city ordinance. Each
person so convicted shall be subject to punishment as provided in section
1-15.
CENTERVILLE, GA., CODE, ch. 6, art. 1, § 6.1 (repealed 2010). Even if part of this
ordinance were arguably constitutional, banning the practice of a religion
(spiritualism) is certainly not. See Complaint at 5, Bibb v. City of Centerville, No.
5:10-cv-153 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 16, 2010), available at http://archive.13wmaz.com/
news/PDF/fortunetellerreport.pdf.
389. Centerville Tells Spiritual Store To Stop Telling Fortunes, 13WMAZ (Apr.
15, 2010, 7:23 PM), http://www.13wmaz.com/news/story.aspx?storyid=7771 1.
390. Centerville Fortune Teller Resolves Lawsuit With City, 13WMAZ (Apr. 28,
2010, 6:45 PM), http://www.1 3wmaz.com/news/local/story.aspx?storyid=78317.
Meanwhile, some cities are repealing crafty sciences ordinances on their own. St.
Johnsbury, Vermont, repealed its ordinance at the behest of a local psychotherapist,
who also practicesfeng shui. See Lisa Rathke, Vt. Town Decides It Has No Right To
Ban Soothsayers, WASH. POST (Sept. 7, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/09/06/AR20080906021 75.html. Apparently the move met
little or no opposition, because no one attempted to enforce the law. Id. The Virginia
town of Front Royal, however, has run into a certain amount of criticism since its
town council repealed a ban on the "magic arts." See Va. Town Repeals Ban on
Fortune Telling, Magic Arts, NBC NEWs4 (Aug. 25, 2014, 9:22 PM),
http://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/Va-Town-Repeals-Ban-on-
Fortunetelling-Magic-Arts-front-royal-27264951 1.html.
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V. CONCLUSION
States and municipalities may not prohibit crafty sciences speech
on the traditional and historical assumption that such speech is
presumptively deceptive. The First Amendment of the U. S.
Constitution protects it, either as speech or as religious expression, no
matter how much a governmental entity may disfavor it. In addition,
a state constitution's Freedom of Speech or Freedom of Religion
Clause, or both, should protect it. To the extent that such a
practitioner wishes to speak, he or she has that fundamental right, and
a willing listener has the right to listen.
States and municipalities may, however, license the practice of
fortune telling, astrology, palmistry and similar activities in the same
way that they license other businesses. If they decide to do so, they
should use content neutral regulations or zoning schemes that do not
discriminate arbitrarily against crafty sciences businesses. The
government should not use permitting schemes that signal to such
individuals and businesses it disfavors them simply because of their
history. The government should use existing fraud statutes to
prosecute any criminal deception it identifies in the community of
practitioners, rather than assuming the deception exists.
Licensing crafty sciences professions sends a strong message to
individuals and groups that government does not discriminate among
beliefs. As courts have repeatedly ruled, individuals and groups are
free to proclaim messages concerning belief or opinion that they wish
to send and those who wish to hear them are free to listen or to ignore
the discussion. Government should act if and when the individuals
delivering the messages step over the line into fraudulent activity.
Properly drawn criminal statutes give government the power to do so.
However, courts must continue to read such statutes together with
other laws and with constitutional protections in order to give the
fullest effect to religious and free speech protections. Robust
religious and free speech expression is a sign of a strong democracy.
Judicial recognition of these rights and the proper legislative use of
licensing uphold the principles of that democracy.
114
[Vol. 37:1
